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were transferred to Air Force Space Command to provide “cradle-to-grave” management 
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systems.  The objective of this research is to determine if the current Air Force Space 
Acquisition policies and processes are efficient and effective according to the GAO-05-
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Questions arose during the Clinton administration as to whether the Department 
of Defense (DoD) was effectively managing space activities.  These questions prompted 
Congress to create a commission in the FY 2000 authorization bill to make 
recommendations on the overall management of the national space programs.  
Recommendations from this commission were released on January 11, 2001, in a report 
titled, “Report of the Commission to Assess the United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization” (also referred to as the Space Commission Report).  The 
commission examined a variety of organizational approaches.  Two recommendations 
that came out of this examination were 1) merging a number of space activities and 2) 
adjusting some chains of command.  More specific to the United States Air Force (AF), 
the commission recommended, “The AF should realign headquarters and field commands 
to more effectively organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained space operations.  
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) should be assigned responsibility for providing the 
resources to execute space research, development, acquisition and operations, under the 
command of a four-star general.”1  The recommendation included moving the Air 
Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) out from under Air Force Material 
Command (AFMC) and aligning it under AFSPC.  The realignment, which took place 
October 1, 2001, gave AFSPC the “cradle-to-grave” responsibilities for space operations 
and acquisitions. 
Figure 1 depicts the organization of Space within the AF prior to the realignment.  
At the time space related activities were centered in the following four elements.   
 
 
                                                 
1  Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization 
Washington D.C.:  Space Commission, 89, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf>. (accessed 5 April 
2006).. 
2 
1. AFSPC controlled space system operations and requirements.  
2.  Where as SMC, under the command of AFMC was responsible for 
design, development, acquisition of space launch, command and 
control, and satellite systems.   
3. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) and the SMC Commander 
served as the Designated Acquisition Commander (DAC).  Each 
reported the cost, schedule and performance of programs they were 
responsible for to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisitions (ASAF (A)). 
4. Advanced technology research was conducted by the Air Force 
Research Laboratory, which was also apart of AFMC. 
 
Figure 1. Organization of Space within the Air Force prior to Realignment 
(From: Space Commission Report, 56) 
 
When consolidating the space functions into a single organization, The Space 
Commission’s goals were to achieve the following:  
3 
1.  An environment with a strong center of support for space professionals.  
2.  Space professionals charged with developing doctrine, concepts of operations 
and new systems to achieve national space goals and objectives. 
3.  More uniformed Military in the Research and Development (R&D) and 
acquisition of space systems.   
4. Developing a Space cadre and advocating education and training for Space 
professionals.2 
Figure 2 shows the organization for Space after the recommendations from the 
Space Commission Report.  As the organization chart shows, the PEO and DAC were re-
assigned to report directly to the Under Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/US) to provide 
program oversight and staff support for AF space acquisition programs. 
 
Figure 2. Recommended Organizational Approach for Space in the Air 
Force (From: Space Commission Report, 90) 
 
                                                 
2  Space Commission Report, 136. 
4 
SMC was moved out of AFMC and placed under the command of  AFSPC.  This 
in turn gave the AFSPC Commander (AFSPC/CC) the authority to program funds and 
direct R&D programs within the AF laboratory system. 
The purpose of this professional report is to analyze the current structure of space 
acquisitions in AFSPC.  A focus will be made on how effective and efficient the policies 
and practices are with the “space acquisition arm” now under AFSPC .  This research will 
analyze if there is a strong commitment in place by way of process, doctrine, and 
reorganization to achieve the goals and objectives outlined in the Space Commission 
Report.  More specifically this research will look at AFSPC’s current polices and 
processes, based on the acquisition realignment, to determine if they are operating 
efficiently and effectively.  In conclusion, this report will provide guidance on areas in 
need of improvement and areas of best practices. 
B. TERMS AND DEFINITION 
The following terms and definitions provide the basis for understanding of the 
concepts that are discussed throughout this research paper. 
Acquisition Arm is defined as the entity in charge of the acquisition of space 
assets and systems. 
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) conducts R&D, test and evaluation; and 
provides acquisition management services and logistics support necessary to keep AF 
weapon systems ready for war.3 
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) provides a full-spectrum space combat 
command preeminent in the application of space power for national security and joint 
warfare.4 
Automated Business Services System (ABSS) The Air Force standard system 
for processing of financial documents.  The system is designed to comply with DoD and 
                                                 
3 Air Force Link. “Air Force Material Command Fact Sheet.” May 2006. 
<http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=143> (accessed 16 May 2006). 
4 Air Force Link. “Air Force Space Command Fact Sheet.” October 2006.  
<http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=155> (accessed 16 May 2006). 
5 
AF regulatory guidance.  ABSS enables any government official with a requirement to 
procure an end item or service, to enter that requirement on-line into an electronic 
system.  The requirement for the end item or service is then accessible electronically to 
the various acquisition business entities so that they may carry out their respective 
responsibilities.5 
Contracting Officer (CO) A person with authority to enter into, administer, 
and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings for the United 
States Government.6 
Component Acquisition Executive (also called Service Acquisition Executives 
(SAEs) (CAE) Secretaries of the Military Departments or Heads of Agencies with the 
power of redelegation.  The CAEs are responsible for all acquisition functions within 
their Components. This includes both the SAEs for the Military Departments and 
acquisition executives in other DoD Components, such as the U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which have acquisition 
management responsibilities.  In the Military Departments, the CAEs are respectively, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 
(ASA(AL&T)), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and 
Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)), and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
(ASAF(A)).7 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) is the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) who has responsibility for 
supervising the Defense Acquisition System.  The DAE takes precedence on all 
acquisition matters after the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary.8 
                                                 
5 Financial Analysis STUDY GUIDE (SG), E3AZR6F071 009-II, p3-7, May 2000, 782D TRAINING 
GROUP, 364th Training Squadron, Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas 
6 Defense Acquisition University. “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms.” 2005. 
<http://www.dau.mil/pubs/glossary/12th_Glossary_2005.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2006). 
7 Defense Acquisition University. 
8 DoD 5000.1 “The Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003. 
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/50001.htm> (accessed 2 June 2006). 
6 
Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the 
Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users. 
Designated Acquisition Commander (DAC) is the individual that supervises the 
execution of programs that are not assigned to a PEO.9 
Development The process of working out and extending the theoretical, practical, 
and useful applications of a basic design, idea, or scientific discovery. Design, building, 
modification, or improvement of the prototype of a vehicle, engine, instrument, or the 
like as determined by the basic idea or concept. Includes all efforts directed toward 
programs being engineered for Service use but which have not yet been approved for 
procurement or operation, and all efforts directed toward development engineering and 
test of systems, support programs, vehicles, and weapons that have been approved for 
production and Service deployment.10 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) The regulation for use by federal 
executive agencies for acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds. The 
FAR is supplemented by the Military Departments and by DoD. The DoD supplement is 
called the DFARS (Defense FAR Supplement).11 
FLY-OFF It is the competing of two different companies against each other, to 
determine which industry platforms are best suited to meet the service's need for a new 
model. 
Full Rate Production (FRP) Contracting for economic production quantities 
following stabilization of the system design and validation of the production process.12 
 
                                                 
9  Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation, “Subpart 5302.1 Definitions.” 
<http://farsite.hill.af.mil/archive/AFFARS/2006-0515/5302.htm> (accessed 30 May 2006). 
10 Air Force Instruction 10-501. AT&L Knowledge Sharing System. 
<http://akss.dau.mil/askaprofakss/qdetail2.aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=24&cgiQuestionID=14355> (accessed 
20 July 2006). 
11 Defense Acquisition University 
12 Ibid. 
7 
General Accounting and Finance System (GAFS/BQ) Installation level 
accounting in support of the United States Air Force.13 
Government Accountability Office (Formerly the General Accounting 
Office) (GAO) An agency of the Legislative Branch, responsible solely to the Congress, 
which functions to audit all negotiated government office contracts and investigate all 
matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds. Determines 
whether public funds are expended in accordance with appropriations to audit all 
negotiated government office contracts and investigate all matters relating to the receipt, 
disbursement, and application of public funds. Determines whether public funds are 
expended in accordance with appropriations.  
Life Cycle Cost (LCC)  The total cost to the government of acquisition and 
ownership of a system over its useful life. It includes the cost of development, 
acquisition, operations, and support (to include manpower), and where applicable, 
disposal. For defense systems, LCC is also called Total Ownership Cost (TOC).14 
National Security Strategy (NSS) This document is produced yearly by the 
National Security Council (NSC) and signed by the President. It provides grand strategy 
and overarching national security goals and objectives for the United States.15 
Major Force Program (Also Major Program) (MFP) In the context of the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a Major Program is an aggregation of Program 
Elements (PEs) that reflects a force or support mission of DoD and contains the resources 
necessary to achieve an objective or plan. It reflects fiscal time phasing of mission 
objectives to be accomplished and the means proposed for their accomplishment.16 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) Designated individual with overall 
responsibility for a program. The MDA shall have the authority to approve entry of an  
                                                 
13 DTS Travel Center, “Systems connected to DTS.” 
<http://www.dtstravelcenter.dod.mil/secs/RI_Systems.cfm> (accessed 7 November  2006). 
14 Defense Acquisition University. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Air Force Instruction 10-501. AT&L Knowledge Sharing System. <http://akss.dau.mil/askaprof-
akss/qdetail2.aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=24&cgiQuestionID=14355> (accessed 20 July 2006). 
8 
acquisition program into the next phase of the acquisition process and shall be 
accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to higher authority, including 
congressional reporting.17  
Program Action Directive (PAD) is defined as a formal planning document that 
helps accomplish a major action such as the reorganization or formation of a MAJCOM, 
organization, unit or function.  The PAD is also used to direct programs on new 
acquisitions, and modifications.  It states the objectives of the program, assigns specific 
tasks to Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and Office of Collateral Responsibility 
(OCR), and establishes milestones.18 
Program Control This term is used for the budget/financial management offices 
in the Air Force acquisition community. 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) is a military or civilian official who has 
responsibility for directing several Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and 
for assigned major system and non-major system acquisition programs.  A PEO has no 
other command or staff responsibilities within the Component, and only reports to and 
receives guidance and direction from the DoD Component Acquisition Executive 
(CAE).19 
Program Management Administration (PMA) Allowable Costs are those 
costs, other than payroll costs for government personnel that support the operation of a 
program office in its management and oversight role. These include costs such as travel, 
printing, supplies, equipment, program office unique computer and communication costs, 
and pre-litigation (before contractor files appeal with Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals or initiates action in court) costs such as evaluation of claims.  Advisory and 
Assistance Services and Federally Funded Research and Development Center contractor 
support to a program office are also PMA  
                                                 
17 “The Defense Acquisition Management Framework, DoD Directive 5000.1.”  U.S. Department of Defense. 
May 2003. <http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5002/Figure1.asp> (accessed 2 September 2006). 
18 Air Force Instruction 10-501.  
19  Defense Acquisition University.  
9 
Program Manager; Project Manager (PM) Designated individual with 
responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for development, 
production, and sustainment to meet the user’s operational needs.  The PM shall be 
accountable for credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA).20 
Research and Development (R&D) Research Includes all scientific study and 
experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields 
of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life sciences related to long-term 
national security needs. Program Elements (PEs) in this category involve pre-Milestone 
A efforts.  
System Program/Project Office (Air Force) (SPO)  The office of the Program 
Manager (PM) and the single Point of Contact (POC) with industry, government 
agencies, and other activities participating in the system acquisition process.21   
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) manages the R&D, design, 
acquisition and sustainment of space launch, command and control, missile systems and 
satellite systems.22 
Space System is defined as all of the devices and organizations forming the space 
network.  These consist of: Spacecraft; mission package(s); ground stations; data links 
among spacecraft, ground stations, mission or user terminals, which may include initial 
reception, processing, and exploitation; launch systems; and directly related supporting 




Transformation is defined by the AF as a process by which the military achieves 
and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or 
                                                 
20 Defense Acquisition University. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Air Force Space Command Fact Sheet, 2006 
23 B. S. Lambeth. “Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space.” A 
Guide to RAND Publications. 2003. <http://www.rand.org/natsec_area/force.html. 135g> (accessed 18 
September 2006). 
10 
technologies that significantly improve its war fighting capabilities or ability to meet the 
demands of a changing security environment.24 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this report is to analyze the AF’s space acquisitions current 
structure under AFSPC and determine if the “Policies and Processes” are efficient and 
effective, as determined by the GAO’s “Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function at Federal Agencies”.  This analysis will provide feedback to AFSPC on 
strengths and weaknesses found, in addition to recommendations for future research.   
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
By focusing on these objectives, the research will provide lessons learned to the 
AF space acquisition community on the efficiency and effectiveness of their current 
processes.  Based on a survey this research will provide areas for improvement and a 
roadmap for improving the processes to reflect what is considered best practices by the 
GAO assessment framework. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The limitations on this research are based on the use of only one model; GAO’s 
assessment framework model.  The survey developed was based only on the GAO’s 
assessment framework to determine if policies and processes are effective and efficient in 
AF Space acquisitions.  This is not a quantitative research focusing on statistical 
significance, but a qualitative exploratory study.  Another limitation is that the data 
gathered is based on only those personnel who answered the questionnaire.  Furthermore, 
it is the first time the GAO assessment framework has been utilized at SMC for this type 
of analysis.  Since there are no historical surveys to compare our research to it is limited 
to only recent information based off current members stationed at SMC.  Without prior 
year surveys a statistical study could not be accomplished. 
                                                 
24 A. J. Fernandez. “Military Role in Space Control: A Primer.” CRS Report for Congress. 2004. 
<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32602.pdf> (accessed 15 August 2006). 
11 
The major assumption of this research is that the Space Commissions 
recommendations have been put into practice.  Other assumptions are that the official 
documents are accurate and derived from DoD directives and AF regulations. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this research was designed to provide a broad understanding 
of the strengths, weakness, issues, policies and processes of the space acquisition arm.  
Material used in the literary review chapter of this research consisted of studies and 
reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation, audit reports from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), documentation provided by the AF 
community, and the Space Commission Report.  This report provides additional insight 
relating to the management and leadership of space acquisitions from personnel in the 
AFSPC community through surveys.  An on-line survey was created based off guidelines 
in the GAO assessment framework.  The survey was distributed to personnel working at 
SMC.  The data from the surveys was analyzed in Chapter IV.  The report verifies the 
existence of critical success factors as determined by the GAO assessment framework.  
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This report is organized into five chapters to ensure a concise review of areas 
analyzed.  This chapter has provided the introduction and background to the study, to 
include an overview of the research project, objectives and limitations.  Chapter II will 
include a literature review comprised of documents such as the Space Commission 
report, PAD and Draft Transition Strategy AFSPC-SMC Realignment.  Along with these 
topics, Chapter II will develop a framework for analysis using the GAO report on 
“Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies.”  This 
assessment framework will provide a qualitative assessment of the strength and 
weaknesses of space acquisition functions in AFSPC using one of the four cornerstones.  
These cornerstones use an interrelated approach; however each can stand alone or can be 
integrated in order to tailor evaluations.  The literature review will be conducted using 
Government Legislation, AF regulations, and DoD guidance.  Chapter III will provide a 
real-world analysis based on current practices and questionnaires conducted during this 
research project.  Additionally, Chapter III will include a summary and analysis of the 
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answers to the questions used in the questionnaires.  Chapter IV will compare and 
contrast results of the literature review with the results of the current practices and 
surveyors; this chapter will also summarize the results of the analysis obtained in 
previous chapter.  Chapter V will provide overall conclusions, recommendations and 
areas for further research. 
H.  SUMMARY 
In conclusion, Chapter I outlines the goals and objectives of this research, which 
are to determine if the AF Space acquisition community’s current policies and processes 
are performing effectively and efficiently as determined by the GAO Assessment 
Framework.  Included in this chapter is background information on recommended actions 







II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses some of the findings and recommendations of the 11 
January 2001 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization Report (referred to as the Space Commission Report).  Furthermore, it  
provides a brief background description of AFSPC and SMC and the SMC transfer from 
AFMC to AFSPC that took place 1 October 2001.  It covers the acquisition, contracting 
and program control regulations that govern space acquisitions.  For example, it provides 
an overview of the non-space acquisition process and the space acquisition process.  It 
thoroughly discusses the acquisition process guidance in accordance DoD Directive 
5000.2, and then moves into an assessment of space acquisitions in accordance to the 
National Security Space Policy (NSSP 03-01).  It covers the contracting FAR and the AF 
Budget regulations related to space acquisitions.  It highlights emerging technologies in 
acquisitions, contracting and program controls that are currently being used to acquire AF 
space systems.  Additionally, space acquisition programs have been reported by the GAO 
as consistently being behind schedule and over cost and not meeting performance 
requirements.  This chapter looks into cost overruns and delays in the Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV).  The chapter 
concludes by identifying the GAO Assessment Framework Model as the assessment tool 
utilized to analyze space acquisition functions at AFSPC. 
B.  COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 
SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION 
1.  Introduction  
The U.S is aware that to become masters of space they would need to find ways 
that would move them toward reducing the cost of building and launching space systems.  
Annually, billions of dollars are spent on space systems in which many will not near 
completion until 10 to 15 years from now.  This means today’s requirements at 
tomorrow’s prices may not allow the U.S. to remain the leader in space.  The sustainment 
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of space assets makes up approximately 30 percent of the life cycle cost.25  Given that 70 
percent of the costs are upfront, it is essential that DoD, the intelligence community, and 
the nation as a whole find ways to increase their investments in career development, 
education and training, and innovative requirements generation when dealing with space 
acquisition.26  In late 2000, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), appointed a Commission to assess the organization and 
management of space activities in support of United States (U.S.) national security.  This 
commission was to provide specific recommendations to improve oversight, 
management, acquisition and operation of U.S. military space systems and capabilities.  
In order to achieve national security objectives, the U.S. must compete 
successfully internationally and maintain technological leadership in space.  To do this, 
they must have a healthy industrial base and improved science and technology resources.  
Moreover, the U.S. must position themselves as risk takers and innovators, not to 
mention establish government polices that support international competitiveness. 
The Commission was established pursuant to Public Law 106-65, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1622 and 
mandated the following in its charter: 
 The Commission shall, concerning changes to be implemented 
over the near-term, medium-term and long-term that would strengthen 
United States national security, assess the following: 
(1) The manner in which military space assets may be 
exploited to provide support for United States military 
operations. 
(2) The current interagency coordination process regarding the 
operation of national security space assets, including 
identification of interoperability and communications issues. 
(3) The relationship between the intelligence and non-
intelligence aspects of national security space … and the  
 
                                                 
25 R.W. McKinney. “Space Acquisitions Today.”  Air Force Space Command High Frontier.  
December,2005. <http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/highfrontierjournal.asp> (accessed 18 July 2006). 
26 R. Catlin. “SMC Mission Brief.” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. June, 2006 
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potential costs and benefits of a partial or complete merger of 
the programs, projects, or activities that are differentiated by 
those two aspects. 
(4) The manner in which military space issues are addressed 
by professional military education institutions. 
(5) The potential costs and benefits of establishing: 
 (A) An independent military department and service 
dedicated to the national security space mission. 
 (B) A corps within the AF dedicated to the national 
security space mission. 
 (C) A position of Assistant SECDEF for Space within 
OSD 
 (D) A new major force program, or other budget 
mechanism, for managing national security space 
funding within DoD.  
 (E) Any other change in the existing organizational 
structure of DoD for national security space 
management and organization.27 
 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 amended the 
Commission mandate, adding the following task: 
(6) “The advisability of: 
 (A) Various actions to eliminate the requirement for 
specified officers in the United States Space Command 
to be flight rated that results from the dual assignment 
of such officers to that command and to one or more 
other commands for which the officers are expressly 
required to be flight rated; 
 (B) The establishment of a requirement that all new 
general or flag officers of the United States Space 
Command have experience in space, missile, or 
information operations that is either acquisition 
experience or operational experience; and  
 (C) Rotating the command of the United States Space 
Command among the Armed Forces.”28 
 
                                                 
27 Space Commission Report, 1 
28 Space Commission Report, 2 
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2.  Space Commission Recommendations 
The Space Commission recommendations were formally released on 11 January 
2001.  The recommendations were based on the following five areas: 
1) The role for space in future national security affairs and the 
challenges the U.S. is likely to confront to its commercial, civil, defense 
and intelligence interests in space. 
2) Objectives for advancing U.S. interests in space by enabling and 
encouraging development of policies, personnel, technologies and 
operations essential to maintaining U.S. leadership. 
3) U.S. agencies involved in national security space as a basis for 
understanding current practices and identifying alternative approaches to 
organization and management. 
4) Current management of space activity at the national level, 
within DoD and within the Intelligence Community. 
5) Recommendations for organization and management, including 
specific proposals to address discrete issues and problems identified in the 
course of the Commission’s deliberations.29 
The commissions recommendations discussed in this report will focus on AF 
acquisition related items.    
There are many organizations involved with National Security Space (NSS).  
Figure 3, displays an example of the organizations from the President all the way down to 
an organization in the AF involved with NSS (prior to the commissions’ 
recommendations).  
                                                 
29 Space Commission Report, 1-7. 
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Figure 3. National Organizational Chart (From: Space Commission Report, 32) 
 
The SECDEF directs each of the military services and guides them on how to 
execute specific space programs, comply with DoD space policy and integrate space 
capabilities into its strategy, doctrine, education, training, exercises and operations.30  
Although the SECDEF directs the services, each has the responsibility to their 
own space capabilities to perform their mission.  However, the Space Commission 
recommended the SECDEF designate the AF as Executive Agent for Space within DoD 
and recommended amending Title X of the U.S. Code to assign the AF formal statutory 
authority to organize, train, and equip for offensive and defensive space operations.  This 
would also give the AF the responsibility of developing, defending, and submitting a 
joint “Space Program Plan” for all DoD space requirements.  Figure 4 shows the new 
structure recommended by the space commission.   
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Figure 4. Implemented Realignment  (From: “Space Commission and the Future of 
Ground Systems Briefing.” Space and Missile Slideshow:  March  2002.) 
 
The AF already controls more than half of space-related budget activity within 
DoD (85 percent) and AFSPC is directly responsible for these systems.  Each year they 
are responsible for spending billions of dollars to meet mission area requirements through 
the procurement and deployment of launch vehicles and space systems.  Not only are 
these systems costly, but they have high 'up-front' expenses compared with those of 
operation and/or disposal, and they usually require many years of research and 
development before the systems become operationally capable.31  For example, a launch 
vehicle, Atlas V Rocket, and its corresponding satellite system (command and control) 
require a launch entailing extensive preparation for deployment before launch, e.g., 
ground support assistance and personnel training.  Once a space system has been 
launched, the cost of maintaining the satellite system is a fraction of the total life-cycle 
cost, consisting primarily of operating and maintaining ground stations and related 
personnel.  
                                                 
31 G.G. Brown, R.F. Dell, H. Holtz, and A.M. Newman. “How US Air Force Space Command 
Optimizes Long-Term Investment in Space Systems. Interfaces. 2003. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.33.4.1.16369> (assessed on 18 November 2006)< 
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Another recommendation from the Space Commission Report involving the AF 
was related to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE) 
NORAD and AFSPC Commander.  The commission recommended that the 
CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD continue to concentrate on space as it relates to warfare in 
the mediums of air, land, sea and space.  The primary role of the CINCSPACE is to 
conduct space operations and provide space-related services, to include computer 
network defense/attack missions in support of the operations of the other CINCs, and the 
national missile defense.  With these broad and varied set of responsibilities the 
commission believed he/she would have little time for other assigned duties and 
recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) create a new, separate 
position for the AFSPC Commander, separate from the CINCNORAD/CINCSPACE.  
Furthermore, the Space Commission Report recommended that the SECDEF end 
the practice of assigning only AF flight-rated officers to the position of 
CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD.  Under this practice, only flight-rated AF officers could 
serve as CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD.  The commission believes it is in the nation’s best 
interest to let the best-qualified officer from any Service fill the position of CINCSPACE.  
This would help ensure that an officer from any Service with an understanding of combat 
and space could be assigned as CINCSPACE.  Also, the CINCSPACE position should 
remain nominative and needs to be rotated among the military Services, especially since 
this position plays a significant role in developing long-term requirements for space 
systems for DoD as a whole, which are increasingly “joint.”  Moreover, by separating 
these positions, it would allow the individual with the required in-depth knowledge of 
space acquisition and operations be selected for the position of AFSPC Commander.    
Along with assigning the AF as the Executive Agent for Space within DoD, the 
commission made recommendations that AFSPC be assigned responsibility for providing 
the resources to execute space research, development, acquisition and operations, under 
the command of a four-star general.  This recommendation entailed moving SMC out 
from under AFMC and realigning it under AFSPC.  This move would allow the AFSPC 
Commander the authority to program funds, direct research, and development programs 
within the AF laboratory system.  In essence, AFSPC would have “cradle-to-grave” 
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responsibility on AF space acquisitions, which would create a strong center of advocacy 
for space and an environment in which to develop a cadre of space professionals.  
Furthermore, the commission believes this realignment would better meet operational 
needs due to the increased role of the uniformed military in research, development and 
acquisition of space systems. 
Another recommendation the commission made dealt with aligning AF and 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Space Programs based on “best practices” of 
each organization.  By appointing a single official within the AF the authority for the 
acquisition of space systems for both the AF and NRO, the commission felt that both the 
DoD and Intelligence Community would benefit.  This entailed assigning the SAF/US to 
the positions of Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space and the Director of NRO (this 
recommendation would require a change in DoD directives, and possibly Congressional 
action to amend Title 10 U.S.C….both the directives and the law implies that a Service 
may have only a single acquisition executive).32  This position would create a senior-level 
advocate for space within the AF and it would offer a single person the authority to 
acquire space systems for the AF and NRO.  In addition, this individual would oversee 
space matters related to acquisition, financial management, manpower and infrastructure. 
The commission had concerns relating to how space budgeting activities seem to 
be untraceable at top level.  Currently, Space funding uses many appropriations across 
DoD and the Intelligence Community.  This causes the problem of not being able to 
identify and aggregate funding information for DoD space programs.  For instance, when 
satellite programs are funded in one appropriation and terminals in another program, 
disconnects and duplications can occur. 
The space commission recommended alternative budget mechanisms, such as 
setting up a Space appropriation or create a Space Major Force Program (MFP).  The 
report suggested that the SECDEF establish a MFP for Space.  The Space MFP would 
provide insight into the management of space programs without restricting the flexibility 
of the SECDEF, Central Intelligence Agency or the military departments.  As a 
                                                 
32 Space Commission Report, 91. 
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management tool, this could be useful in helping make the various elements of DoD’s 
space program more visible and provide accountability for space funding decisions. 
The space commission believes the MFP should be managed in the same fashion 
as MFP 1 through 10 that DoD already has in place.  It would contain the same program 
elements as the previously recommended Space Program Plan, which would be managed 
under the direction of the AF as Executive Agent for Space (previous recommendation).  
Furthermore, by establishing a MFP for Space, DoD would be able to aggregate related 
budget items into a single program independent of the appropriation process.  
C. DOD DIRECTIVE 5000 SERIES GUIDANCE AND DIRECTIVES 
The DAE issued the DoD Directive 5000 series to provide governing policy and 
guidance for the acquisition of defense systems. 
1. DoD Directive 5000.1 
The acquisition process is directed by DoD 5000.1; it is the governing DoD policy 
document on “Defense Acquisition.”  The primary objective of DoD 5000.1 is to acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable 
price.33  This directive [DoD 5000.1] applies to all elements of the DoD and describes 
policies and broad management principles that are applicable to all DoD acquisition 
programs.  
This directive does not provide specific guidance to specific defense systems, but 
merely provides direction to Program Managers (PM) and Milestone Decision 
Authorities (MDA) on how to tailor program strategies and oversight by using innovation 
to reduce cycle time to meet operational needs.  Additionally, this directive states the 
following principals will be followed: collaboration, financial management, professional 
workforce, and a streamlined organization just to highlight a few. 
To govern the implementation of these acquisition policies and principles, DoD 
5000.2 was established. 
 
                                                 
33 The Defense Acquisition Management Framework. 
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2. DoD Directive 5000.2 
This directive specifies “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS).”  Its stated 
purpose is “to establish a simplified and flexible management framework for translating 
mission needs into stable, affordable, and well-managed programs”.34  The regulation is 
organized into five parts as shown in Figure 5 with six appendices and it contains a 
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Figure 5. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework (After:  The Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework) 
 
The PM and MDA are to use the Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
when procuring defense systems.  The MDA may authorize entrance into the acquisition 
system at any point, so long as it is consistent with phase-specific entrance criteria and 
statutory requirements.  The progression through this acquisition life cycle is dependent 
upon sufficient knowledge acquired and efforts made on behalf of the PM. 
                                                 
34 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.2.” U.S. Department of Defense.  May 
2003. <http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5002/Subject.asp> (accessed 2 September 2006).  
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D.  DOD LIFE CYCLE COSTS 
Life cycle costs are the total cost to the government for a program (e.g., weapon 
system) over its full life, including research and development, support equipment, initial 
inventories, training, data, facilities, and other investments. Life Cycle Costs may also 
include the costs associated with the operation and support of systems.  Regardless of the 
system, there is an involved cost.  The typical DoD system (i.e., aircraft weapon 
program) incurs increased life cycle cost during production and operational support.  The 
primary difference in space programs is they incur a larger percentage of their life cycle 
costs before deployment compared to aircraft weapons programs.  Figure 6 shows a 
theoretical life cycle comparison of DoD systems and space systems.  Although space 
systems are composed of ground based control systems and terminals, the space-based 
portion of the system drives key decisions as the impact of failure is greatly magnified.  
Systems must work when placed on-orbit for long periods of time, without maintenance, 
in some cases 10 years or longer.35   
 
Figure 6. Typical and Space Life Cycle Cost Curves  (From:  McKinney, R.W. 
“Space Acquisitions Today.”  Air Force Space Command High Frontier.  
December,2005.  <http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/highfrontierjournal.asp> (accessed 18 
July 2006). 
                                                 
35 R.W. McKinney  
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Therefore, it is essential that systems engineering is accomplished correctly 
before launch to ensure program success.  Furthermore, seldom are there “test” satellites 
made before a production run, which means it must be done right the first time around. 
Thus the need for an acquisition process and policy with these factors in mind 
would be needed for future space acquisitions.  In additions the MDA needed to create a 
new streamlined acquisition policy for space systems separate from the defense systems. 
E. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)  
In contrast to DoD 5000.2, which defines an overarching DoD acquisition 
management process and mandatory procedures, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) regulates acquisition planning and contracting.  The FAR governs all acquisition 
practices and codifies uniform policies and procedures to regulate the acquisition of 
supplies and services by all executive agencies.36  The importance of the FAR is that it is 
the highest ranking document with statutory regulations within it, and is the common 
denominator in every contracting acquisition initiated by DoD (or any other executive 
agency of the federal government, except where expressly excluded).   
F. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACQUISITION POLICY 03-01 
Differences between acquisition of defense systems and acquisition of space 
systems in DoD drove the creation of NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01.  This policy 
complements, not replaces, the existing DoD acquisition guidance found in DoDD 5000.1 
and DoDI 5000.2.  As with any policy, the intent of NSS 03-01 was not to constrain the 
acquisition community to a strict set of rules that must be followed at all costs.  Rather, it 
is a guide that outlines the major documents, decisions, and products expected from an 
acquisition program.  The DoD not only wanted to follow a more logical acquisition 
model for space, but it also wanted to improve its ability to acquire space systems that 
met the user’s needs.  
Figure 7 highlights three of the differences between defense systems acquisition 
and space systems acquisition. 
                                                 
36 Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation, “Subpart 5302.1 Definitions.”  <http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm > 
(accessed 30 May 2006). 
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Figure 7. Differences between Defense and Space Systems Acquisition (From: Capt 
Jennifer Martin, October 2006). 
 
1) Fly Offs are non-existent for a satellite system like the Defense Satellite 
Communication System (DSCS) in contrast to the F-22. 
 2) According to the Defense Acquisition University, Low-rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) is described as:  
The first effort of the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase. The 
purpose of this effort is to establish an initial production base for the 
system, permit an orderly ramp-up sufficient to lead to a smooth transition 
to Full Rate Production (FRP), and to provide production representative 
articles for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) and full-up 
live fire testing. . The minimum number of systems (other than ships and 
satellites) to provide production representative articles for Operational 
Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to establish an initial production base, and 
to permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to 
Full Rate Production (FRP) upon successful completion of Operational 
Testing (OT).  For ships and satellites, the LRIP quantity is the minimum 
quantity and rate that preserves mobilization.37 
 3) Hardware modifications after launch do not exist in missile launches where as 
aircraft tend to have numerous modifications throughout their flying years.  
Figure 8 shows a historical example of a large quantity DoD program.   
                                                 
37 Defense Acquisition University, 139 
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Figure 8. F-22 Production Profile  (From: National Security Space Institute.  “The 
National Security Space Acquisition Model.”  Training Slideshow: August 1996). 
 
It is intended to highlight the three previously discussed differences .  The concept 
and requirements generation for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (now the F-22) occurred 
in the early 1980’s.  The U.S. needed a replacement for the F-15 to defend against the 
Soviet threat.  Demonstration/Validation was conducted with full scale mock-ups of a 
YF-22 and YF-23 version of the airplane.  A “fly-off” was held in early 1990 to 
determine which airplane would be approved to enter development. 
Originally, the F-22 production was going to be 750 aircraft.  Yet, the F-22  faced 
numerous funding cuts throughout its development cycle.  In order to weather these 
funding storms, and still deliver the required capability, the Systems Program Officer 
(SPO) reduced the number of production aircraft.  By 1997, the production number was 
cut to 339 aircraft. 
Large scale programs generally have hardware “fly-offs”.  In this case, each 
contracting team built a prototype–the YF-22 and the YF-23.  These prototypes were 
evaluated before the Full Scale Development (FSD) phase began (FSD is now called 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD)).  This strategy was executed to 
provide risk reduction in the technology development. 
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Another difference illustrated in Figure 8 is that the Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) consisted of eight test aircraft.  LRIP provides three functions.  First, it establishes 
an initial production base for the system.  Second, it permits an orderly increase in the 
production rate.  Third, it provides production-representative articles for Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E.)  
Once the F-22 reaches Full Rate Production (FRP), changes can still be made to 
improve performance.  Hardware and software maintenance will continue throughout the 
life of the program. 
Comparing the F-22 acquisition, a defense system acquisition, to the DSCS III 
acquisition, a space system acquisition, as the following figure does, it becomes clearer 
why there was a need to supplement DoD 5000 Directives to acquire space systems that 
met the user’s needs and at the same time follow a more logical acquisition model for 
space. 
 
Figure 9. DSCS III Production Profile (From: National Security Space 
Institute.)  
 
Figure 9 shows a historical example of a small quantity space program.  It is 
intended to highlight several points. 
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Originally, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Phase III 
production was to be 14 satellites.  It remained 14 satellites.  (The first one was launched 
in CY82; the remaining 13 are depicted above with their lot deliveries, launch dates and 
launch vehicles).  The cutting of satellite constellation units would result in coverage 
gaps which may lead to an inability to provide the required capability.  Production runs 
for satellite systems are very small and tend to be completed within a few (e.g. 5-8) years. 
For DSCS, there was no hardware “fly-offs.”  The program began in CY76 with a 
competition for satellite designs in CY77.  There was a “Down Select” to one contractor 
based on paper concepts.  The first launch occurred just five years later.   
While there’s really no such thing as a “test article” in the space business, there 
was a “test” delivery of three DSCS satellites, circa CY80.  All three satellites have been, 
or still are, operational. 
When faced with funding cuts, the SPO maintained flexibility by stretching the 
program out.  Notice the production line ended in CY88, but the last satellite was 
launched in CY03.  That is 15 years in storage.  (In actuality, the last DSCS III was in 
storage 21+ years) 
The last four DSCS III satellites were so old, that a Service Life Extension 
Program was created to update them.  They were completely refurbished before launch.  
As an interesting aside, the last DSCS III launched was a refurbished “test” satellite. 
Once a satellite goes into orbit, there is no way to perform hardware maintenance 
on it.  “Spares” are built in through redundancy.  Software patches are possible, but 
extremely limited and time consuming to perform through the Air Force Satellite Control 
Network (AFSCN).38 
G. AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION (AFI) 65-601, VOLUME 1, US AIR FORCE 
BUDGET POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
This instruction contains rules and procedures for using USAF appropriated 
funds.  It applies to resource managers at all levels and provides the broad guidelines for 
                                                 
38  National Security Space Institute. “The National Security Space Acquisition Model.” Training Slideshow: 
August 1996. 
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financial managers to carry out their mission responsibilities.  It provides guidance on 
budget authorization, allocations and allotments.  This includes limitations on funds use 
required by law and limitations on funds use required by the legislative and executive 
branches of the federal government and the USAF on allocation documents.  Limitations 
and budget authority guidelines are also covered in this instruction.  Furthermore, this 
instruction provides guidance on what various appropriations can and can not buy since 
each appropriation has specific statutory authority.  For instance, chapter eight covers 
procurement funding.  It provides guidance on full funding, advance procurement, 
multiyear procurement, advance Economic Order Quantity, and Engineering Change 
Orders/Engineering Change Proposals.   
H. AFMC INSTRUCTION 65-603, APPROPRIATION REIMBURSEMENT 
PROCEDURES 
AFSPC did not deal with large scale acquisition processes prior to acquiring SMC 
in October 2001; therefore, they did not have any AFSPC instructions for these large 
scale acquisitions.  Moreover, SMC still continues to use AFMC FAR supplements for 
the management of space acquisition programs, since the AFMC FAR supplement covers 
large scale acquisitions.  Furthermore, even though SMC now falls under AFSPC, they 
still use AFMC instructions for acquisition related budget guidance.  For instance, SMC 
uses AFMC Instruction 65-603 for guidance on reimbursement procedures. This 
instruction provides budget and accounting procedures for those cases in which AFMC 
organizations provide reimbursable or non-reimbursable materiel or services to DoD and 
non-DoD agencies, non-US government organizations, commercial organizations, and 
foreign governments.  This instruction covers the budget office responsibilities in 
identifying and properly tracking reimbursements.  
I. AFMC INSTRUCTION 65-605, PROGRAM MANAGEMENTS 
ADMINISTRATION (PMA) GUIDANCE 
The purpose of this instruction is to establish consistent application of funding 
PMA costs for acquisition programs.  PMA funding is used for mission essential program 
office operations in direct support of a program.  PMA can be funded with RDT&E, 
O&M or procurement funds.  This instruction is used to ensure that PMA costs are tied to 
the program that drives the cost.  The purpose of capturing PMA funding in the 
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appropriate area is to ensure accountability of cost associated with a weapon system.  
This is to comply with Congressional intent to reflect the full cost of each weapon system 
providing greater cost visibility.  Table 1 from AFMCI 65-605 provides guidance on 
PMA Allowable Support Costs. 
 
Type of Service  Examples 
1. Contract Services for Program 
Office Operations 
Program office computer support, 
configuration management costs, cost 
estimating/analysis, and consulting services 
(including TEMs, CITA and FFRDC or A&AS 
type contracts). 
2. Travel in Support of Program 
Office Efforts 
Program office travel supporting Program 
Management Reviews, Negotiation Reviews, 
and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). PMA 
procurement and RDT&E appropriation TDY 
funding will not be provided to higher HQ 
management staff for administrative reviews. 
3. System Program Office (SPO) 
supplies and equipment purchases, 
rentals, leases, and maintenance. 
Off-base program office space rental. Unique 
(above standard) equipment maintenance leases 
to include copiers, fax machines, on-demand 
repair contracts, and special graphics support. 
4. Unique Communication Expenses  Program office video teleconference networks, 
direct long distance line with prime contractors.
5. Program Office Specific Training  Specialized short-term technical training for 
program office assigned personnel that directly 
relate to performance of functions in support of 
the direct mission program (e.g., Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) preparation 
training). This does not include funding college 
degrees on either full time or part time basis. 
Degrees are funded by host base or career 
program training funds. 
6. Printing and Reproductions  Program office printing for DABs and Requests 
for Proposal (RFP). 
 
Table 1. PMA Allowable Cost (After:  Air Force Instruction 65-605, 
“Program Managements Administration Guide.” 2003. http://www.e-





J. CONTRACTING, FINANCE AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTIONAL DISCIPLINES  
Space acquisition is performed by many functional disciplines; this research 
focuses specifically on policies and procedures within these functional areas: contracting,  
finance and acquisition management.  Per the POTOMACON briefing, below is a brief 
overview of the three functional disciplines and the responsibilities that each are 
responsible for. 
1. 64P Contracting Officers 
In the acquisition community, Contracting officers are responsible for the 
following: 
A) Planning, organizing and directing contracting operations 
B) Select contractors, assemble contracts and make awards 
C) Advise commanders and staff on contracting operations 
D) Formulate contracting policies 
E) Create new contracts for new programs 
F) Administer existing contracts 
G) Accept final systems39 
 
2. 65F Finance Officers 
In the acquisition community, Finance officers are responsible for the following: 
A) Plan, organize, develop techniques, and establish internal controls to 
manage financial services 
B) Advise commander and staff on status and progress of command 
programs 
C) Prepare, justified, and submit financial plans and budget estimates 
                                                 
39 Air Force Personnel Center, “Acquisition Officers POTOMACON Brief,” March 31, 2002 
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D) Performs cost and economic analyses 
E) Develop cost estimates for programs 
F) Monitor contract performance on existing contracts
40
 
3. 63A Acquisition Management Officers 
In the acquisition community, Acquisition Management officers are responsible 
for the following: 
A) Plan and organize acquisition management activities 
B) Direct programs in conceptual phases and throughout the development, 
manufacturing, production, deployment, and sustainment stages 
C) Manage engineering, program control, test, manufacturing, quality, and 
logistics support tasks 
E) Translate operational requirements to system design 
F) New Weapon Systems 
G) Upgrading existing weapon systems 
H) Manufacturing and quality oversight 
I) Manage Contractor task
41 
 
K. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) REPORTS 
This research is focusing on the polices and processes of space acquisition 
programs.  Space acquisition programs have been reported by the GAO as consistently 
being behind schedule and over cost and not meeting performance requirements.  The 
following are two examples of space acquisition programs that have been identified by 
the March 2006, GAO-06-391 “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major  
 
 
                                                 
40 Air Force Personnel Center 
41 Ibid 
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Weapon Programs,” as to encountering cost overruns and delays. The first is the Space 
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the second is the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV). 
1. Space Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS) 
The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program is a culmination of several 
attempts to develop and deploy a follow-on capability to the successful 25-year-old 
Defense Support Program (DSP).  Although it has proven to be a very capable system, 
DSP was not designed to meet the evolving theater critical and ballistic threats of the 21st 
century.  The USAF awarded the SBIRS High Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) contract to Lockheed-Martin, in November 1996, which has gone 
well beyond what was to be a 10-year effort and has more than doubled from its initial 
cost of $4.1 billion. 
The mission of SBIRS is to develop, deploy, and sustain space-based surveillance 
systems for missile warning, missile defense, battlespace characterization, and technical 
intelligence.  SBIRS would be a consolidated, cost-effective, flexible system that would 
meet U.S. infrared space surveillance needs through the next 2-3 decades.42 
The SBIRS contract was awarded under the old Requirements Generation System, 
which is a contributing factor to the system being behind schedule and extremely over 
budget.  According to retired Air Force Undersecretary Peter B. Teets, the system was to 
have its first launch in 2002 and now a tentative scheduled launch of 2008.43  The initial 
$4 billion contract, as of June 2004 was at $10 billion with an estimated completion cost 
of $11 to $12 billion and with a contract completion date of 2014.  Figure 10, gives a 
simple look at the initial cost estimate and the percentage of cost increases since the 
beginning of the SBIRS program. 
                                                 
42 “Air Force Link. “The SBIRS Fact Sheet”, Space and Missiles Center, October 2006. <http://www.SBIRS 
RESEARCH\SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM.htm> (accessed 8 April 2006). 
43 N. Gaudiano. “Troubled SBIRS High Now Seen As Only Option.” C4ISR Journal.  31 July 2005. 




Figure 10. Cost Milestone’s of SBIRS Program 
 
The most recent program manager for SBIRS at SMC in Los Angeles has been 
faced with numerous problems.  These problems range from oversight of contractors, 
technology challenges, and software development problem.  SIBRS has undergone 
several changes since it initial startup.  Originally, the system was envisioned as a large 
system of systems comprising two constellations—one in geosynchronous orbit and 
another in low earth orbit—that was plagued by delays and technical problems.  In 2001, 
the Program Manager, under the direction of Mr. Peter B. Teets, began to separate the 
program into stand-alone units.44  This reorganization now consist of a ground command 
and control element, along with placing the SBIRS low-orbit half of the system under the 
Missile Defense Agency and is now known as the space tracking and surveillance system 
(STSS).45  Although this reorganization will streamline the SBIRS acquisition process, 
and with the government regaining, control over the program, correcting past mistakes 
remains a systematic effort. 
From 2002 to 2005 the USAF had to notify congress three times, of what 
informally is referred to as the Nunn-McCurdy provision, since SBIRS High crossed the 
25 percent cost-growth threshold.46  By the time the latest GAO report came out in 
March of 2006, the USAF had to report two more Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches; 
consequently, deciding not to buy two satellites, reducing the GEO satellites to three, one 
of the primary satellites and the spare. 
                                                 
44 H.S. Kenyon. “Restructured Satellite Program Aims for Liftoff.” Signal Magazine. 31 July 2005. 
<http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=25> (accessed 6 April 2006). 
45 Ibid, 25. 
46 N. Gaudiano. 
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Due to increasing cost in space acquisition, the House of Representatives 
requested the GAO conduct research on “Space Acquisitions” and provide a report to the 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, and House of 
Representatives.  After several years of research, the GAO concluded that DoD has been 
unable to match resources to requirements, before beginning individual programs thus 
setting the stage for technical problems, which lead to cost and schedule increases.  GAO 
suggested that DOD adopt practices that would:  Separate technology development from 
an acquisition program, employ revolutionary approaches that pursue incremental 
increases in capability and guide program start decisions with investment strategies that 
identify overall capabilities and how to achieved them, that is, what role space will play 
versus other, air-, sea-, and land-based assets and priorities for funding.  Figure 11, below 
taken from the GAO report shows a comparison between the Original Cost Estimates and 
Current Cost Estimates of Major Space Systems Acquisitions currently underway.47 
  
Figure 11. Original Cost and Current Cost Estimates of Major Space Systems 
(From: Government Accounting Office. “Space Acquisitions, Stronger Development 
Practices and Investment Planning Needed to Address Continuing problems.” GAO-05-
891T. Washington, D.C., 12 July 2005.) 
                                                 
47 Government Accountability Office. “Space Acquisitions, Stronger Development Practices and Investment 
Planning Needed to Address Continuing problems.” GAO-05-891T. Washington, D.C.,  12 July 2005. 
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As Figure 11 depicts, DoD must continue to find ways, as with the establishment 
of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, to agree up front on what 
capabilities are needed and how to achieve those capabilities in a timely and cost 
effective process.48  Some of the lessons learned from mistakes made on programs like 
SIBRS, can be applied to future acquisitions by ensuring funds are available for other 
critical roles in national security and military operation.  The lessons learned from SBIRS 
include paying close attention to cost that has become a higher priority than mission 
success, unrealistic estimates that lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs.  
Additionally, the lack of discipline in system requirements; and the government’s space 
acquisition capabilities were seriously eroded.  Lastly, industry failed to implement 
proven management and engineering practices.49 
Clearly one can see that space is completely different from other complex weapon 
systems and their procurement.  The complexity of space systems and associated ground 
and launch systems are profound, thus the development challenges are intrinsic to the 
space industry.  Most of the challenges faced today have less to do with technology than 
with the process by which space programs are structured and procured.  It is evident that 
operational space is not a broken process. 
2. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is a major part of the 
DoD space-lift modernization effort.  The U.S. must maintain a robust, responsive, and 
resilient space transportation capability as a key to success in space borne operational 
capabilities, such as communications, weather, navigation, positioning/timing, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  The AF awarded the EELV development 
effort to both Lockheed Martin and Boeing in 1998.  Through April of 2006 the program 
cost has risen over 81 percent.  
                                                 
48 Government Accountability Office. “Space Acquisitions, Stronger Development Practices and Investment 
Planning Needed to Address Continuing problems.” GAO-05-891T. Washington, D.C.,  12 July 2005. 
49 M.A. Hamel. “Military Space Acquisition: Back to the Future.” Air Force Space Command High 
Frontier.  (Vol. 2 Number 2). <http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/highfrontierjournal.asp> (accessed 18 July 
2006). 
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EELV was originally initiated as a FAR part 12 services contract; however it was 
later converted to a FAR part 15 services contract due to the commercial launch market 
not materializing as presumed.  The intent of the EELV program started with the 
objective of selecting one contractor to meet the goal of reducing launch costs by at least 
25 percent.  In 1997 the market for launch capability showed a dramatic increase in 
commercial launch demand.  This assessment led the USAF and U.S. space launch 
contractors to enter into a partnership where both contractors would provide launch 
services to the military and would also be allowed to sell their services to the commercial 
marketplace.  In January 2005 the official US Space Transportation Policy stated that “for 
the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the EELV program shall be the 
foundation for access to space for intermediate and larger payloads for national security, 
homeland security, and civil purposes to the maximum extent possible.”50 
The USAF’s EELV program is less of an acquisition of equipment and more of 
acquisitions of commercial satellite launch services from two competitive families of 
launch vehicles.  The Atlas V is Lockheed Martin’s effort and the Delta IV is Boeing’s 
effort.  Each family has a number of variants depending on the lift capability necessary 
for each mission.  The government to date has launched three satellites using EELV and 
the commercial sector has launched eight.   
The largest contributor to the EELV cost increase is the significant decline in the 
commercial launch market upon which the program’s business case was based.  This 
misjudgment about the extent to which DoD could rely on commercial demand to 
leverage its investment has lead to a $12.6 billion increase.  In 2004, the program 
experienced cost increases exceeding 25 percent, which triggered a Nunn-McCurdy 
provision, a statutory requirement to reassess and recertify the program.51 
Due to the serious cost increase, GAO sees EELV as one of the space acquisitions 
programs that need serious improvements.  Typical suggestions include separating 
technology development from the acquisition program and establishing more realistic 
                                                 
50 Gregory E. Wood. “Tough Decisions to Assure Access to Space.” Air & Space Power Journal, (2006). 
51 General Accountability Office., “Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions.” GAO-03-1073. Washington, 
D.C., September 2003. 
 38
cost estimates to create the program budget.  In this instance though, it was hard to 
predict the commercial space-launch market collapse.  In addition, DoD based many of 
the EELV decisions on lessons learned from past shortcuts.  This time DoD would not 
count on one system as it did in the 1980s when it suffered a two-and-one-half year 
grounding of all space launches following the loss of the Challenger space shuttle.52 
Despite the rising costs, the U.S. sees it as essential that it retains this assured 
access to space.  Current decisions make it obvious that part of the plan includes having 
two distinct launch vehicles for redundancy.  The continued decline in commercial 
launch demand has forced the government to share the risk with launch providers through 
a new acquisition strategy.  The USAF will contract to support each contractor’s annual 
infrastructure through a launch capability contract and replace price-based competition 
with an annual award of launch service contracts.53 
Much has occurred in the EELV program since 1998.  The cost has increased 
greatly, but the U.S. sees domestic space launch capability as an absolute necessity.  This 
system is projected to provide almost all U.S. space launch capability through the year 
2020 and therefore must survive current shortfalls.  As with all DoD systems, cost will 
continue to be a major concern.  The EELV program office needs to be vigilant in the 
oversight of its current contracts.  The USAF knows that it must work hard to minimize 
costs while maximizing capability, but sound decisions must be made to ensure current 
and future domestic space launch resources are available. 
L. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
The space acquisition environment is dynamic and is constantly changing.  The 
following are examples of the emerging trends/technologies that are being incorporated 
into space acquisitions.  The first one discussed is Evolutionary Acquisitions (EA), which 
was identified by DoDD 5000.1 as the preferred approach to use in providing useful 
military capability to the operational user as rapidly as possible.  Next is the Contracting 
Management Maturity Model (CMMM), which is utilized to access an organization’s 
                                                 
52 Gregory E. Wood. 
53 Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions, 54. 
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contract management process capabilities and can also be used periodically to assess an 
organization’s contract management process maturity. The last emerging technology 
discussed is the Comprehensive Cost and Requirements System (CCaRs).  This system is 
an automated tool used by financial managers in the space acquisition community.  It 
encompasses a comprehensive cradle to grave requirements and execution tracking tool. 
1. Evolutionary Acquisitions  
Evolutionary Acquisitions (EA) falls under emerging technology since it has only 
been used in DoD as a preferred approach since 2000.  Its DoD roots however started in 
the early 1980s.  Figure 12 shows some of the major milestones starting with a study by 
the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) and formal 
endorsement by the Joint Logistics Commanders.  The figure also shows the rigor and 
numerous groups of DoD agencies that looked at EA before it was finally accepted.  
Although only recent programs started performing acquisitions under an evolutionary 
approach, many past acquisitions programs have used aspects of EA.   
         
Figure 12. Evolution of a Policy Concept  (After:  Sylvester R.K. and Ferrara 
J.A. (2003). Conflict and Ambiguity - Implementing Evolutionary Acquisitions. 
Acquisitions Review Quarterly). 
 
EA is part of a greater effort to make DoD acquisitions more responsive to rapidly 
changing threats, and changes in technology and warfighter needs.  There is also hope 
that this change will help increase DoD’s control over program costs, program manager 
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accountability, and participation of high-tech firms in DoD weapon acquisition programs.  
The following are specific attributes that will help accomplish the above objectives: 
• Get useful increments of new capability into the hands of U.S. personnel more 
quickly 
• Take better advantage of user feedback in refining system requirements and 
developing subsequent increments of capability 
• Mitigate technical development risk in weapon programs that are to employ 
new or emerging technologies 
• Facilitate the periodic injection of new technology into weapons over their life 
cycles, so as to better keep pace with technological changes54  
One of the confusions about EA is that many use other similar terms 
interchangeably.  Terms like Spiral Development (SD), Block Approach, and Incremental 
Acquisition to mention a few.  The problem with this is that each term has its own unique 
description that makes it different and therefore adds confusion when used improperly.  
The following Figure 13 shows how EA and SD can go together, but notice that they are 
not the same concept. 
                                                 
54 G. J. Pagliano and R. O’Rourke. (2004) Evolutionary Acquisitions and Spiral Development in DOD 
Programs: Policy Issues for Congress.  Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 
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Figure 13. Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development.  (After: 
Pagliano, G. J. and O’Rourke, R. (2004) Evolutionary Acquisitions and Spiral 
Development in DOD Programs: Policy Issues for Congress.  Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress). 
 
Incremental acquisition is an acquisition strategy of gradually improving a 
capability through a planned series of block upgrades, each of which is to be acquired and 
fielded.  SD is a strategy for achieving a new capability through the phased development 
of fieldable prototypes; it may take several development “spirals” before a system is 
ready for production.55  EA may use portions of each strategy depending on how mature 
the key technologies are and on how well defined the user’s requirements are.   
DoD and Congress have also come up with specific definitions for EA and SD.  
EA is “an acquisition strategy that defines, develops, produces or acquires, and fields an 
initial hardware or software increment of operationally useful capability.”  SD is “an 
iterative process for developing a defined set of capabilities.” A related accommodation 
has been to recognize that well-known and long-used program strategies, such as pre-
planned product improvement and block upgrades, are themselves forms of EA.56  This 
                                                 
55 R.K. Sylvester and J.A. Ferrara (2003). Conflict and Ambiguity - Implementing Evolutionary 
Acquisitions. Acquisitions Review Quarterly 
56 Ibid, 22. 
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accommodation is important since it shows that DoD has experience with several aspects 
of EA and should expand on the successes of these methods. 
Concentrating specifically on EA, DoD Directive 5000.1 states: 
To ensure that the Defense Acquisition System provides useful military 
capability to the operational user as rapidly as possible, evolutionary 
acquisition strategies shall be the preferred approach to satisfying 
operational needs.  Evolutionary acquisition strategies define, develop, 
and produce/deploy an initial, militarily useful capability (Block I) based 
on proven technology, time-phased requirements, projected threat 
assessments, and demonstrated manufacturing capabilities, and plan for 
subsequent development, production, and deployment of increments 
beyond the initial capability over time (Blocks II, III, and beyond).57 
To better understand what EA does for DoD, we must compare it to the traditional 
acquisition method.  The traditional approach is known as single step to full capability 
(SSFC).  DoD would first define a specific performance requirement to be met.  Then 
under SSFC, DoD would work for many years to develop and build a design that, upon 
first deployment, was intended to meet 100 percent of that requirement.  EA on the other 
hand will set aside the quest for 100 percent fulfillment of the requirement in the initial 
version of the weapon and instead rapidly develop an initial version that meets some 
acceptable fraction of the requirement.  Field experience with this initial version is then 
used to develop later increments of the weapon that meet an increasing fraction of the 
requirement, until a version is eventually developed that meets the 100 percent 
standard.58 
If used properly, EA is very applicable to space acquisitions.  Space is currently 
on a push to a steady approach of system procurement.  The DoD Directive 5000.1 
explanation of EA is perfect for the things space is trying to accomplish.  Core capacities 
for space would be built around modular space platforms, which would be produced in 
order to be launched on a regular cycle.  This core capacity is what EA block I promises 
to deliver.  Development of a new package would occur in parallel but would not be 
                                                 
57 The Defense Acquisition Management Framework, 4. 
58 Pagliano, 2. 
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deployed until it was mature enough not to delay the production cycle.  This subsequent 
development of greater capability falls under the concept of future EA increments or 
blocks.  The bias of the acquisition system would be towards deployment with as simple 
a system as possible on a regular deployment schedule, which would make costs more 
predictable.59 
There are consequences for using EA as the preferred approach.  These 
consequences include more upfront work being necessary; a greater role for acquirers in 
the requirements process and the acquisition process; and a new approach to budgeting.60  
The changes that already occurred in space acquisitions by bringing SMC into AFSPC 
were a perfect start for confronting the above consequences and facilitating the required 
interaction and coordination.   
If personnel in SMC try using EA in a SD approach with immature technology 
and ill-defined user requirements, then chances of success will greatly diminish.  As 
Robbin Laird (a Washington and Paris-based defense and aerospace consultant) explains, 
“SD has become, in practice, synonymous with the structural incapacity to launch 
sufficient or adequate capability at a reasonable price.  The problem is requirements creep 
in the development stage and an overly optimistic plan for technological breakthroughs in 
the development cycle.  To make EA work in space acquisitions, SMC must also get 
away from projecting technical possibilities that are simply unrealistic within the 
production schedules.”61 
2. Contract Management Maturity Model 
The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) is a tool used to measure an 
organization’s contract management process capability and can be used periodically to  
 
 
                                                 
59 R. Laird (2006). “OpEd: Fixing Space Acquisition: From Spiral Development to Cookie-Cutter Production.” 
Space News Business Report. <http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/Laird_021306.html> (assessed 06 October 
2006). 
60 10. Sylvester 
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assess an organization’s contract management process maturity.  The results of the 
assessment may be used as a road map to improve the organizational contract 
management process capability.62   
This model is used to help the buying and selling organizations focus on key areas 
of process improvement.  Furthermore, it helps the organization assess the major steps 
they need to accomplish when buying or selling products, services and integrated 
solutions to the public or private business sectors.  The CMMM reflects five levels of 
maturity.  A maturity level refers to a level of organizational capability created by the 
transformation of one or more domains of an organization’s processes.  These five levels 
are ad-hoc level (Level 1), basic (Level 2), structure (Level 3), Integrated (Level 4) and 
Optimized (Level 5).63  By identifying these five maturity levels in an organization, it 
will allow the organization to obtain the capability and effectiveness in its contract 
management processes.  By using the CMMM, an organization has the ability to look into 
its contract management processes and dissect them into six key processes.  These six 
processes are the “cradle to grave” steps for a buying organization in contracting.  They 
include, procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, 
contract administration, and contract closeout.  For a selling organization they include, 
presales activity, bid/no-bid, bid or proposal preparation, contract negotiation and 
formation, contract administration and contract closeout.  Each of the buyer and seller 
key processes reflects the tools, techniques and proven best practices that a leading 
organization would use in their respective contract management processes.64 
As the USAF is faced with the Global War on Terrorism, it has begun to look at 
the transformation of its acquisition environment.  Currently, the USAF acquisition 
environment is rapidly changing the way it does business to deliver capability faster and 
at a lower cost.  The acquisition community is dedicated to getting an operational, 
                                                 
62 G.A. Garrett and R.G. Rendon (2005). Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools, National 
Contract Management Association. McLean, VA. 
63 Ibid, 48-50. 
64 G.A. Garrett and R.G. Rendon (2005). Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools, National 
Contract Management Association. McLean, VA. 
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suitable, effective, best value and affordable product to the warfighter, in the least amount 
of time.  In order to do this it has to rethink its business processes.   
In late 2001 with the recommendation of the Space Commission to realign SMC 
under AFSPC, many changes had to take place in the organizations contract management 
processes.  SMC was affected by this realignment, and along with the big contractors that 
build the space assets.  To assist both of them in this realignment the CMMM could be 
utilized in analyzing their contract management processes. 
3. Comprehensive Cost and Requirements System (CCaRS) 
CCaRs is an automated tool used by financial managers in the space acquisition 
community.  It encompasses a comprehensive cradle to grave requirements and execution 
tracking tool.  CCaRs is a comprehensive database that pulls information from the budget 
query (BQ) financial system: General Accounting and Finance System (GAFS), and the 
Web-Based Automated Business Services System (ABSS).  It provides automated 
budgeting, cost estimating, budget execution, contract management, reconciliation and 
reporting tools. 
As a budget tool, CCaRs has the ability to track the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) Cycle and assign budget amounts to thoroughly defined 
requirements.  It tracks budget authority as appropriated funds are loaded into the 
financial systems.  Furthermore, it helps ensure compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act 
Compliance by tracking programmable quarterly allotments.  It also allows managers to 
prioritize and approve requirements through an electronic coordinated workflow process.  
This in turn gives Project Officers/Resource Advisors the tool to verify if their 
requirements are funded and/or where they stand on the unfunded priority list. 
CCaRs also provides analyst with cost estimating features, to aid in budget 
request validation.  The system has an Excel spreadsheet attached that provides the cost 
estimators with the foundation for a detailed estimate.  For instance, all requirements 
loaded in the system include a basis of estimate that is tied to the fiscal year budget 
requests.  All estimates are reviewed during coordination and assigned a confidence 
rating.  Furthermore, the system stores historical estimates for future cost estimating. 
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CCaR's budget execution capabilities provide increased efficiency for budget 
analyst through time saving features.  CCaRs in essence provides a one stop shop for 
budgetary data.  It supports all DoD funding documents (also electronic signatures).  For 
example, funding documents created in CCaRs are electronically submitted to ABSS.  
Through the interface with ABSS, CCaRs automatically identifies certified documents.   
Individuals can also coordinate on ABSS documentation through CCaRs.  The system 
also aids analyst in obligation and expenditure forecasting.  It has the ability to define 
baseline and revised forecasts and can tract contract and non-contract obligations and 
expenditures.  Additionally, analyst can see the original commitment document linked to 
obligations and expenditures in CCaRs.  
CCaRs also benefits the entire space acquisition community with its contract 
management tool.  This tool provides baseline and consolidated contract data.  The 
system supports 'C' type and delivery order contracts.  Furthermore, it can track Section B 
and Section G information by modification and track obligations at the CLIN and ACRN 
level for each modification and each voucher processed.  The system also has the ability 
to display total obligations and expenditures by a particular CLIN or ACRN.  This 
information can help in contract reconciliation efforts. 
CCaRs also provides budget analyst with information to aid in reconciliation of 
funding records.  The system is able to identify and highlight Defense Finance 
Accounting System (DFAS) discrepancies.  As with ABSS, CCaRs interfaces with 
GAFS.  DFAS commitments, obligations and expenditures are automatically linked to 
CCaRs positions.  Furthermore, CCaRs stores historical transactions that have been 
purged by DFAS for future financial reference. 
Through the interfaces with the various financial systems and the stored data, 
CCaRs provides analyst with the capability to analyze and report on financial information 
in a timely manner.  CCaRs allows analyst to view budget execution data and funding 
requirements at various levels.  For instance, the analyst can analyze the data at a rolled 
up level or at detailed line item level.  The flexibility in CCaRs allows for an efficient and 
effective budgetary analysis.  Budget analysts also use CCaRs to generate charts for 
budget briefs.  These charts are automatically produced in PowerPoint format and all data 
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can be further edited within PowerPoint.  Some examples of charts produced in CCaRs 
are the stoplight, snake, obligation event timeline and expenditure event timeline.  Figure 
14 shows an example of an expenditure snake chart.  This feature is extremely beneficial 
to budget analyst in that all the data from briefings can be automatically pulled from one 
system and time is not wasted on gathering data and spending time putting charts 
together. 
Computer Generated by CCaR 30-Aug-2006
Obligation Snake Chart
Program 1 Composite FY2006 - ($M)
FY2006 OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP FY07+
Baseline Forecast ($M) 0.0 12.3 62.3 65.0 65.9 66.4 66.5 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.7 66.7 75.3
Current Forecast ($M) 6.5 13.2 23.2 66.2 66.7 75.4 80.7 87.4 91.7 92.3 92.6 93.4 94.3
CCaR Actuals ($M) 6.5 9.7 20.4 65.2 65.7 75.4 80.7 87.3 91.7 92.2 92.5
DFAS Actuals ($M) 0.0 9.8 16.7 19.8 63.4 66.1 73.9 75.0 82.2 82.5 86.2
OSD Goals ($M) 7.1 14.1 21.2 28.3 35.3 42.4 49.5 56.6 63.6 70.7 77.8 84.8
Goal Color Indicator G R G G G G G G G G G
Baseline Forecast (%) 0.0% 13.1% 66.1% 69.0% 70.0% 70.4% 70.5% 70.6% 70.7% 70.7% 70.8% 70.8% 79.9%
Current Forecast (%) 6.9% 14.0% 24.6% 70.2% 70.7% 80.0% 85.6% 92.7% 97.3% 97.9% 98.2% 99.1% 99.8%
CCaR Actuals (%) 6.9% 10.3% 21.7% 69.2% 69.7% 80.0% 85.6% 92.6% 97.3% 97.9% 98.1%
DFAS Actuals (%) 0.0% 10.3% 17.7% 21.0% 67.3% 70.1% 78.4% 79.5% 87.2% 87.5% 91.4%
OSD Goals (%) 7.5% 15.0% 22.5% 30.0% 37.5% 45.0% 52.5% 60.0% 67.5% 75.0% 82.5% 90.0%
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Figure 14. Obligation Snake Chart (After: Ironfield Briefing.) 
 
Not only does CCaRs provide PowerPoint charts but it also has query tools that 
allow users to build custom and complex reports that can be exported to Excel 
spreadsheets.  Some of the budget reports than CCaRs can generate are effects of budget 
cuts, schedule slips and requirement increases. 
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CCaRs is an effective tool for budget analyst to us in their day to day operations.  
It saves valuable time with its ability to interface with various systems and generate 
budgetary charts and reports.  It also provides program oversight by highlighting funding 
discrepancies between ABSS and DFAS. 
M. GAO ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK MODEL 
As the federal budget has been spread thin to cover the ever increasing national 
defense missions, it is imperative that defense dollars are utilized in an efficient, effective 
and accountable manner.  In today’s environment, contractors have become viable 
participants in meeting national defense missions.  For instance, hundreds of billions of 
dollars are spent annually on contractor provided goods and services for DoD.  However, 
assessments from the GAO, Inspectors General (IG) and other accountability 
organizations continue to identify systematic weaknesses in key areas of acquisitions.65  
With not enough money to cover all the needs of the military, it is crucial that DoD use 
every dollar wisely.   
To improve the federal government’s ability to acquire goods and services in a 
cost effective manner GAO published GAO-05-218G, “Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies” in September 2005.  Federal employees and 
industrial experts provided GAO with information related to human capital, information 
management, financial management and acquisition practices.  GAO used this 
information along with information gathered within the experienced GAO community to 
develop the assessment framework.  The objective of the assessment framework is to 
provide federal agencies with a tool in conducting an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of their acquisition functions.  The foundation of the assessment framework 
was built with the concept of management’s responsibilities as they relate to internal 
controls, to include plans, methods and procedures used to meet agencies missions, goals 
and objectives.  The assessment framework consists of four cornerstones:  
 
                                                 
65 General Accountability Office. “Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal 
Agencies.” GQO-05-218G.  Washington, D.C., September 2005. 
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1. Organizational Alignment and Leadership 
2. Policies and Processes 
3. Human Capital 
4. Knowledge and Information Management   
The GAO assessment believes these four cornerstones are essential to an efficient, 
effective, and accountable acquisition process.  The cornerstones were established to be 
interrelated to support an integrated evaluation of an organization.  However, the 
assessment framework also allows each cornerstone to stand alone and be evaluated 
independently.  This gives agencies the flexibility to tailor the evaluation to their 
organizational needs.    
To assist agencies in evaluating their organizations GAO has broken down each 
cornerstone into elements and critical success factors.  The elements are an integral part 
of the organizational effectiveness of the cornerstone it stems from.  To analyzing each 
element, GAO has provided critical success factors.  These success factors focus on 
program results and mission accomplishment.  The presence of the critical success factors 
indicates that the organization will have an increased ability to consistently achieve their 
desired acquisition objectives.  However, if the critical success factors are absent it may 
indicate that the organization has areas with high risk or areas that need additional 
management attention.  Figure 15 illustrates the Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function.   
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Figure 15. Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function (From: 
Government Accountability Office. “Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function 
at Federal Agencies.” GQO-05-218G.  Washington, D.C., September 2005.) 
 
In the assessment framework, GAO has also provided three indicators to help 
organizations determine if they are effectively employing the critical success factors.  
The first indicator is ‘key questions.”  These questions are provided to help organizations 
determine the presence or absence of critical success factors.  The next indicator is the 
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“situations to look for.”  This area provides examples of activities and practices that 
signify good acquisition outcomes.  The last indicator provided in the assessment 
framework is the “cautions.”  This area is the opposite of “situations to look for” and 
provides examples of activities and practices that could be damaging acquisition 
outcomes.  Appendix 4 illustrates the three indicators (key questions, situations to look 
for, and cautions) for each critical success factor utilized in this research. 
N. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this chapter gave a brief overview of current acquisition policies, a 
look into two space systems with cost overruns and delays.  It identified several emerging 
technologies that are being utilized to assess current procedures and ways of tracking and 
analyzing cost data.  Lastly, the GAO assessment framework was introduced as a way to 
assess acquisition processes, based on information gathered from numerous DoD 
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III. CASE STUDY APPLICATION 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will give a brief history of AFSPC and SMC, it will convey the 
mission of both organizations.  Furthermore, it will give insight to how the AFSPC 
command structure is organized as well as that of SMC.  Additionally, this chapter will 
introduce the research method, collect evidence, generate questions and analyze 
evidence. 
B. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 
1. AFSPCs History 
AFSPC is headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and became 
known by this name in 1985.  However, its origin dates back to 1982 when it was 
activated as the “Space Command”.  In these early days, “Space Command” was 
organized to manage missile early warning systems and space tracking systems, later 
taking on space surveillance and missile warning sites around the world.  Upon being 
renamed to its current name of AFSPC, it assumed responsibility for commanding, 
controlling and receiving telemetry information from a variety of military satellites.  In 
addition, it doubled in size and was put in charge of acquiring space launch capabilities 
and control of the nations Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).  In October 2001, 
the command assumed the SMC at Los Angeles AFB from the AFMC.  This move 
brought to the command responsibility for the development and acquisition of space and 




In April 2002, AFSPC became a separate four-star Air Force Command with the 
designation of the AFSPC Commander as a four-star position, thus making it distinct  
 
 
                                                 
66 Air Force Link. “Air Force Space Command Almanac 2004-2005”, 
<http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-060316-011.pdf> (accessed 20 September 2006). 
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from the commanders of U.S. Space Command and NORAD.  As the USAF’s Executive 




AFSPCs primary purpose is to defend the U.S. through its satellites and ICBM’s. 
The Space Force Mission is to defend the U.S. through the control and exploitation of 
space.  AFSPC’s direct annual budget authority is a approximately $3.2 billion.  
Approximately 40 thousand people, including 27.1 thousand military members and 
civilians, and 13.7 thousand contract employees, combine to perform AFSPC missions.
68
   
2. AFSPCs Mission  
AFSPC’s role is to ensure reliable access to space is made to the war fighter.  In 
addition, they use ICBMS forces to deter any adversary contemplating the use of 
weapons of mass destruction.  AFSPC has five primary mission areas:   
1)  Space support by using expendable launch vehicles to launch satellites, and 
other high-value payloads into space, and control them once in space. 
2) Conduct counterspace operations, which encompass surveillance, negation, 
and protection.  
3) Provide force enhancement to the war fighter through weather, 
communications, intelligence, missile warning and navigation. 
4) Space force application by maintaining and operating a rapid response, land-
based ICBM force as the USAF only on-alert strategic deterrent.
69
 
5) Mission support is focused on the basic resources necessary to support 
AFSPC systems and personnel.  
 
                                                 
67 Air Force Space Command Almanac, 5. 
68 T.A. Mehuron, AF Almanac, Air Force Magazine, 
<http://www.afa.org/magazine/May2006/default.asp> (accessed 1 September 2006). 
69 Air Force Link. “SMC Link.” 2005. http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/smc%20msn_vsn.doc 
(accessed 16 May 2006). 
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C. SPACE AND MISSILES SYSTEM CENTER 
1. SMCs History 
SMC originated in 1954 as the Western Development Division (WDD) of the Air 
Research and Development Command.  The Division’s original mission was to develop 
ICBMs; as this was a top military priority due to the Soviet Unions race to do the same.  
Soon, thereafter they were given the added responsibility of developing the first military 
satellite system. In 1957, WDD was redesignated as the Air Force Ballistic Missile 
Division (AFBMD).  The AFBMD was given sole ownership of development of military 
space systems, with the exception of the NRO, which was responsible for reconnaissance 
satellites and related systems.  By 1961, AFBMD had two parallel missions, yet it 
seemed unclear if the missiles and space systems belong together.  Thus, due to 
increasing importance of space systems AFBMD was inactivated and replaced by the 
Ballistic Systems Division (BSD) and Space Systems Division (SSD).70  Over the course 
of the next several decades, these two divisions went through numerous reorganizations 
and redesignations.  Finally, by 1992 they were redsignated as the Space and Missiles 
System Center (SMC) that is still activated today and located at Los Angeles AFB, 
California.   
Today, SMC is the home of the USAF's premier space acquisition center of 
technical excellence for researching, developing, and purchasing military space systems.  
SMC is developing, building, fielding, and supporting satellites and launch vehicles that 
represent the largest space program in DoD.  The center is also responsible for on-orbit 
check-out, testing, sustainment, and maintenance of military satellite constellations and 
other DoD space systems.  SMC has an annual total budget in excess of $6.5 billion per 
year and employs 1.6 thousand military members, 1.2 thousand civilians and an estimated 
900 contractors worldwide.  It manages between $50 and $60 billion in contracts at any 
one time and manages 12 major programs and/or functional systems.71    
                                                 
70 Air Force Link. “History Office of the Space and Missiles System, history of the high ground.” 
2005. >http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/HO/INDEX.HTM> (accessed 20 September 2006). 
71 History Office of the Space and Missiles System, history of the high ground. 
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As previously mentioned in Chapter II, in January 2001, the Space Commission 
stated the importance of the USAF’s management of space programs and recommended 
the realignment of SMC from AFMC to AFSPC, thus bringing developers and operators 
of military space systems together under one major command and signifying a significant 
change in the management of military space programs.72 
2. SMCs Mission  
The mission statement at SMC is to “deliver unrivaled space, missiles and 
information capabilities and systems to the joint war fighter and the nation”.73  SMC is 
the technical center of excellence for researching, developing, and acquiring military 
space systems.  Their primary mission areas are: 
1) Acquire, deliver and sustain effective and affordable space and missile 
systems that exceed war fighter needs. 
2) Evolve and synchronize ground systems to support current and future 
space and joint war fighter requirements. 
3) Lead the way in developing Responsive Launch and Joint War fighting 
Space (JWS) capabilities. 
4) Acquisition Excellence, meaning re-engineer and improve internal 
business and operations processes, hone their acquisition capabilities to 
better control costs, meet schedule and achieve technical performance 
requirements.74 
The SMC mission can be better understood by looking at Figure 16.  The usual 
space mission event is the launch of a payload into the earths orbit.  This event consists of 
six segments, which can be separated into two parts: the launch vehicle and the space 
system.  Both parts have the following segments: space, ground support and terminal.  
SMC supports the conceptualization, acquisition, and the technical /engineering 
                                                 
72 Air Force Link. “SMC Link.” 2005. http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/smc%20msn_vsn.doc 




development and execution of all six segments.  Additionally, these events are supported 
by a global infrastructure that consists of launch, range, and sensors.  SMC’s strategic 
goal in all of this is to make the space mission execution, ground support, and launch 
affordable, reliable and a routine for the war fighter. 
 
Figure 16. Typical Space Mission (From: “The Environmental Publication of 
the Air Force Space Command Frontiers.”  Frontiers, January 2002). 
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3. SMC’s Organization after Realignment in AFSPC 
SMC was realigned from AFMC and placed as a subordinate unit under AFSPC 
on October 1, 2001.  Figure 17 shows the realignment of SMC from AFMC to AFSPC, 
showing the increased in responsibility AFSPC acquired.   
 
 
Figure 17. SMC Realignment (After:  Mueller, J. “Commission to Assess United 
States National Security Space Management and Organization Brief.” August 2001.) 
 
4. SMC’s Organization 
In July 2006, SMC reorganized and renamed its organization to mirror the 
traditional USAF structure.  This reorganization was to increase effectiveness and 
provide a command authority to develop, acquire and sustain military space power.  With 
this realignment came the activation of six subordinate acquisition wings, 21 groups, 12 
squadrons, 20 divisions, two system offices and the 61st Air Base Wing. 
The six renamed subordinate wings in figure 18 include the following: Military 




Positioning Systems Wing, Space-Based Infrared Systems Wing, Satellite Control and 
Network Systems Group, and Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Systems 
Group.75 
 
Figure 18. New SMC Wing and Group Organizational Chart (After: Leeman, 
William S. “Final ASU Organizational Chart.” Slideshow: 2006) 
 
D. GAO ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
To analyze Space Acquisitions, the GAO’s “Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies” was utilized.  As mentioned in Chapter I time 
limits the ability to research every cornerstone.  This research paper was narrowed down 
to an analysis of A.F. Space Acquisitions using the cornerstone of “Policies and 
Practices.”  More specifically, it concentrates on the element “Effectively managing the 
Acquisition Process.”   
According to the GAO assessment framework, the cornerstone “Polices and 
Practices” represents the basic principles that govern the way an agency performs 
                                                 
75 Air Force Print News Today, “New Structures, names for SMC organization”, 4 Aug 2006.  
<http://www.military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,MPDC_AirForce_All_News_080706_11,00.html> 
(accessed 7 August 2006). 
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acquisition functions.  Having effective and efficient policies and processes in place can 
help improve an organization’s acquisition outcomes.  To be efficient, polices and 
processes need to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of organizational members.  
To be effective policies and processes need to empower organizational members at all 
levels.  This will allow for the most effective procurement of goods and services.  Also, 
to be effective, policies and processes need to be in place to allow/encourage open 
communication across departments.  In order to be successful, all departments need to be 
involved in the planning and managing of the acquisition process.  After all each 
department has a contribution in accomplishing the acquisition mission.  Without 
effective and efficient policies and processes in place, an organization can miss 
opportunities to achieve savings.  Furthermore, weak policies and processes in place can 
cause work redundancy and cost overruns.   
The GAO assessment framework provides three elements under the Policies and 
Process cornerstone.  However, due to time limitations this analysis was narrowed down 
to focus on the element, “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process.”  This element 
emphasizes the fact that the acquisition process does not end once a contract is awarded.  
It is important to monitor the process throughout to ensure that goods and services are 
delivered according to the schedule, cost, quality and quantity agreed upon when the 
contract was awarded.  The GAO assessment framework provides four critical success 
factors to guide in an assessment of the “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process” 
element. 
1. Empowering Cross-Functional Teams 
Monitoring the process takes various functional disciplines in the Acquisition 
community; which emphasizes the need for “empowering cross function teams”.  In fact, 
this is one of the critical success factors provided by the GAO in the assessment 
framework under the element “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process.”  To 
manage the acquisition process effectively management needs to ensure cross functional 
teams are utilized.  By having individuals from different functional disciplines on a team 
facilitates the right mix of knowledge, technical expertise and credibility.  According to 
the GAO assessment framework, “Teams are responsible for analyzing spending data, 
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identifying and prioritizing potential opportunities for more detailed review, defining 
internal needs and requirements, and conducting market research.”76 
2.  Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
The second critical success factor given under this element is “Managing and 
Engaging Suppliers.”  This critical factor helps an organization determine if they have a 
successful relationship with suppliers.  Good relationships with suppliers in acquisition 
organizations can lead to lower costs, higher quality, and shorter product design and 
delivery time.  The GAO framework provides four strategies to help develop effective 
supplier relationships within the context of the FAR. 
1. Establishing effective supplier relationship management as a core business 
Strategy 
2.  Employing rigorous supplier selection to create a strong supplier base   
3.  Establishing commodity managers to more effectively manage key goods and 
services. 
4.  Establishing and maintaining an effective communication and feedback system 
with suppliers
77  
3. Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes 
The third critical success factor used in this analysis is “Monitoring and Providing 
Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes.”  To accomplish this effective and efficient 
polices and processes need to be in place to ensure that trained personnel are in the 
positions to oversee the contractors and their requirements.  Management with in Space 
Acquisition needs to ensure that contractors are monitored throughout the entire 
acquisition process to ensure AFSPC is receiving the needed goods and services from 
contractors.  One process that is available to AFSPC to accomplish this is the EVM 
process.  EVM is one method DoD uses to monitor large projects’ process toward cost, 
schedule and performance goals.    
                                                 
76 Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies,  16. 
77 Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies, 18. 
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4. Enabling Financial Accountability 
The last critical success factor under the element being analyzed is “Enabling 
Financial Accountability.”  As the DoD budget continues to be heavily strained, smart 
financial accountability is essential in defending and requesting funding for a program.  
In the acquisition community, a program’s financial information should be traceable from 
conception to completion.  The financial information needs to be useful, relevant, timely 
and reliable, otherwise the time spent gathering, analyzing and disseminating the 
information, is wasteful and leads to inefficient business practices.  Furthermore, it is 
vital to the organization’s overall mission that financial information be communicated 
throughout the entire organization (all levels and cross functional teams).   
E. COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE 
To have an understanding of how well AFSPC is doing with policies and 
processes the research team conducted a literature review, gathering evidence by 
reviewing recent GAO reports and articles on SBIRS and EELV and development of a 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire was used to gather information from top-level members 
and working- level members from the six system wings at SMC.    
A discussion/GAO assessment of the acquisition process of the problematic 
SBIRS and EELV systems allowed the research team to obtain a rich account of the 
events that took place and the policies and procedures in place at that time.  This method 
“paints a picture” by providing documented analysis and interviews.  The questionnaire 
developed by the group provided a written list of questions that was given to a large 
number of people via a survey, where many of the possible answers are pre-coded, so that 
the questions can be answered quickly and the responses subsequently analyzed using 
numerical methods. 
F. QUESTIONS GENERATED 
Upon reviewing many of the policies and processes presented in the literature 
review, the team developed the questionnaire based on the acquisition framework 
published by GAO that was introduced in Chapter II.  The team felt the GAO assessment 
framework would provide a systematic method for evaluating the acquisition 
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organization as it was based on studies and reports from numerous DoD agencies, federal 
agency inspector general offices and several other government agencies.  The 
questionnaire focused on the Policies and Processes cornerstone, which was constructed 
based on only one of the elements, “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process”.  As 
previously stated in Chapter I, each of these cornerstones can stand alone for evaluating 
an organization.  The team felt that it would be beneficial to distribute the questionnaire 
to the six system wings within SMC; however, limitations would be placed on who 
would receive the questionnaire. 
The team met with subject mater experts, discussed the questions, and determined 
the focus of the research would be a qualitative exploratory study.  As a result of the 
meeting, the team agreed to develop a questionnaire using the “Likert Scale Method”.  
This method is to present a series of statements to the respondent.  The questionnaire is 
not a quantitative statistically significant developed questionnaire.  This questionnaire is 
an exploratory assessment tool used to acquire feedback from the SMC workforce. The 
respondent is asked to indicate their degree of agreement with the statement.  The team 
used a five point scale as follows: (1) Definitely Agree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neither agree or 
disagree, (4) Agree, and (5) Definitely Agree. 
Next, the team met with a member of the SMC senior leadership to organize 
dissemination of the questionnaire to the six system wings at SMC.  We concluded that 
the questionnaire should be anonymous and taken by USAF military and civil service 
personnel who work as Program Directors and Functional Directors of the system wings.  
The distribution of the questionnaire was engineered to cover all available SMC Program 
Directors or Functional Directors.  The questionnaire was disseminated via a web link 
sent through the internal e-mail system.  Results of the questionnaire were accumulated 
instantly in a survey database and were immediately available for analysis.  The team 
gave the participants two weeks to submit replies.  The data from the questionnaire was 
used to assess the strengths and weaknesses of SMC’s policies and process.  Based on the 
responses the team highlighted areas of strengths and weaknesses and provide 




This chapter described the organizational history and the research objective of this 
study.  Furthermore, it discussed the methodology developed to conduct the research 
design, collection of evidence, questions generated and evidence analyzed.  The next 







IV. ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss the findings from the questionnaire obtained from SMC 
personnel.  To best analyze the information from the questionnaires collected, the raw 
data was split into four critical success factors and by functional disciplines as seen in 
Figure 19. 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS  FUNCTIONAL DISCIPLINES 
     
1. Empowering Cross-Functional Teams  1. Acquisitions 
     
2. Managing and Engaging Suppliers   2. Contracting  
     
3. Monitoring and Providing Oversight      3. Finance 
    to Achieve Desired Outcomes    
    
4. Enabling Financial Accountability   4. Other  
Figure 19. Questionnaires’ Critical Success Factors and Functional Disciplines  
 
This way we can find out how personnel view their organization in the four 
distinct factors of study and we can draw similarities and differences between how 
acquisitions, contracting, finance, and other personnel rate their organization. 
B. SETUP AND ANALYSIS 
There were 30 responses to the questionnaire. 14 people most closely associated 
themselves with the Acquisitions Management functional discipline.  Four people most 
closely associated themselves with the Contracting functional discipline.  Seven people 
most closely associated themselves with the Finance functional discipline.  In the “Other” 
category, we had an Engineer, a Systems Engineer, a Cost Analyst, an Administrative 
respondent and a Sustainment respondent. 
The results that follow are based on the 5-point scale discussed in Chapter III.  
The scores have been normalized so that for every question with a low score correlates to 
a negative perception of the policies and processes with the organization and a high score 
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correlates to a positive perception of the policies and processes.  The analysis that follows 
focuses strictly on the means calculated for each section and on the cumulative means.  A 
score of 1 is the lowest score attainable and a score of 5 is the highest score attainable of 
the questionnaire responses.  The numeric results for the entire questionnaire are 
available in the appendix. 
C. RESULTS 
1. Empowering Cross-Functional Teams 
The critical success factor of Empowering Cross-Functional Teams started the 
questionnaire by asking SMC personnel to rate statement number 2: “Our organization 
uses cross-functional teams in performing acquisitions activities.”  Every functional 
discipline rated this statement as its highest agreement.  Overall, the respondents gave 
statement 2 a mean score of 4.57.  The other statement that everyone rated high was 
statement number 4, “I feel empowered to make decisions that affect the projects 
outcome.”  This statement received a mean score of 4.03.  The most negative statement 
from this critical success factor was statement 10 with a mean score of 3.30.  The 
statement read, “There are incentives in place to encourage my team to meet project 
goals.”  Two of the feedback write-ups in the questionnaire specifically addressed 
statement 10.  These write-ups read, “Available concrete incentives are very limited in 
most cases.” and “Program office substitutes constant pressure to achieve deadlines 
without any incentives or recognition of hard work to meet deadlines.”   
Acquisitions personnel gave statement 2 a mean rating of 4.36.  The other 
statement that Acquisitions personnel rated high was statement number 4.  This statement 
was given a mean rating of 4.00 by this functional discipline.  The lowest mean score 
given by Acquisitions personnel was 3.36 for statement number 10.  For this critical 
success factor the Contracting personnel had scores relatively close to the scores of the 
Acquisitions community.  They gave statement 2 and 4 a mean rating of 4.50 and 4.25 
respectively, and they gave statement 10 their lowest mean rating of 2.50. 
On the other hand, Finance personnel had their second highest mean scores with 
statement 3 and statement 5.  These read: “We involve staff from field offices in 
acquisitions decisions.” and “I use a project plan to manage and control implementation 
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of projects.”  The mean score for both of these statements was a 4.00.  This functional 
discipline gave statement 6 and 8 their lowest scoring.  These read: “My project’s plan 
uses performance measurement baselines for schedule and cost.” and “My project’s plan 
uses performance measurement baselines for risk associated with the project.”  The mean 
score for both of these statements was a 3.14. 
The “Other job” categories were consistent with the Acquisitions personnel by 
giving statement 4 a 4.40 but individually they also liked statement 7; which reads, “My 
project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for major milestones and target 
dates.”  They gave this statement a mean score of 4.40.  This functional discipline rated 
statement 9 lower than the other functional disciplines.  Statement 9 reads, “I involve 
individuals outside the project team to regularly review the status of cost, schedule or 
performance goals.”  The mean score for this statement was 3.20. 
Figure 20 is a snapshot of how the acquisition community individually ranked the 
12 statements in this category.  Table 2 and Figure 20 below gives a breakout of the mean 
score for each question by individual functional disciplines along with the overall mean 
average for each question. 
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(5 being highest positive)  




Table 2.   CSF 1 Empowering Cross Functional Teams 
 
2. Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
The second critical success factor is Managing and Engaging Suppliers.  In this 
category, the statements with the overall highest mean scores were statement 15 with a 
mean score of 3.54 and statement 18 with a mean score of 3.61.  Statement 15 reads, “My 
organization uses a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong supplier base.”  
Statement 18 reads, “As a core business strategy, my organization embraces effective 
supplier relationships.”  The statements with the lowest overall mean score was 
statements 16 with a mean score of 3.07 and statement 19 with a mean score of 2.86.  
Statement 16 reads, “My organization uses strategic purchasing managers for key goods 
and services.”  Statement 19 reads, “My organization provides training to its acquisition 
workforce on how to manage supplier relationships.”  When it comes to suppliers, one 
feedback write-up that sheds some light on suppliers and contracting was, “In most cases, 
the Government is well aware of the Primes, but not so aware of the key subcontractors 
and vendors of key parts -- this has bitten us many times, and we are starting to learn to 
ask the right questions.  Most of the feedback is through award fees and benchmarking -- 
and through daily contact of Government & contractor IPTs and PMs.” 
For the second critical success factor, Managing and Engaging Suppliers, the 
Acquisitions personnel had the highest mean average for statement 18.  It reads, “As a 
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core business strategy, my organization embraces effective supplier relationships.”  The 
mean score for this statement was 3.83.  The lowest mean for this critical success factor 
by the Acquisitions personnel was statement 16.  It reads, “My organization uses strategic 
purchasing managers for key goods and services.”  The mean score for this statement was 
3.08. 
The Contracting personnel ranked statement 15 highest with a mean score of 3.75.  
It states, “My organization uses a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong 
supplier base.”  These personnel ranked statement 19 the lowest with a mean score of 
2.00.  It states, “My organization provides training to its acquisition workforce on how to 
manage supplier relationships.”  For this critical success factor, the Finance personnel 
were consistent with the Contracting personnel and gave statements 15 and 19 a mean 
score of 3.71 and 2.43 respectively. 
The “Other” personnel once again agreed with the Acquisition personnel in their 
assessment of statements 16 and 18.  They gave these statements a mean score of 3.80 
and 3.20 respectively.  This “other personnel” also gave statement 20 and 21 a mean 
score of 3.20.  The statements read: “My organization has established an effective 
communication and feedback system with its suppliers to continually assess and improve 
its own and its supplier’s performance.” and “My organization fosters an environment in 
which its suppliers invest their intellectual capital – their ideas – into the venture” 
respectfully. 
One thing to keep in mind is that this section of Managing and Engaging 
Suppliers will become more and more important as the defense industry continues to 
consolidate.  As SMC starts dealing with fewer contractors and subcontractors it should 
establish relationships based on thorough knowledge of the organization and how to 
incentivize them properly.   
Figure 21 is a snapshot of how the acquisition community individually ranked the 
12 statements in this category.  Table 3 and Figure 21 below gives a breakout of the mean 
score for each question by individual functional disciplines along with the overall mean 
average for each question. 
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Table 3. CSF 2 Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
 
3. Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes 
Overall, the statements with the highest mean for this critical success factor were 
statement 24 with a mean score of 3.92 and statement 25 with a mean score of 3.96.  
Statement 24 reads, “My organization has processes and controls in place to ensure 
effective oversight of contractor performance.”  Statement 25 reads, “My organization 
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has processes and controls in place to ensure effective oversight of employees making 
purchases.”  The statements with the lowest mean were 32a with a mean score of 2.42 
and statement 32b with a mean score of 2.38.  Statement 32a reads, “A significant 
percentage of contracts fail to meet cost.”  Statement 32b reads, “A significant percentage 
of contracts fail to meet schedule.”  Furthermore, statement 26 was low with a mean 
score of 3.15.  Statement 26 reads, “My organization rewards our workforce for 
effectively monitoring contractor performance.”  When it comes to a possible explanation 
to statements 32 a, b, c and d, here is one feedback write-up: “Many current problems are 
a result of previous faulty acquisition reforms.  Getting back on track, but it will not be 
instant nor without great effort and sound correction of problems.” 
The Acquisitions personnel gave statement 25 the highest mean in Monitoring 
and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes critical success factor.  The mean 
score for this statement was 4.20.  For this critical success factor and for the entire 
questionnaire, everyone agreed their least favorable statements were 32a and 32b.  In this 
case, the Acquisitions personnel gave both statements a mean score of 2.90 and 2.80.  
The statements were, “A significant percentage of contracts fail to meet cost.” and “A 
significant percentage of contracts fail to meet schedule.”  One other statement that 
Acquisitions personnel saw less favorably is statement 32, which reads, “My organization 
monitors effectiveness of policies and processes.”  The mean score for this statement was 
3.20. 
The Contracting personnel gave statement 24 the highest mean in this critical 
success factor.  The statement reads, “My organization has processes and controls in 
place to ensure effective oversight of contractor performance.”  The mean score for this 
statement was 4.50, which tied with statement two listed previously as the highest mean 
score they gave to any statement in the entire questionnaire.  For the lowest, acquisition 
personnel gave statement 32 a mean score of 1.50 and statement thirty-tow b received a 
mean score of 1.75.  The Contracting personnel were consistent with Acquisitions’ 
assessment of statement 31 and gave it a mean score of 2.25 but also gave 2.25 to 
statement 26.  It reads, “My organization rewards our workforce for effectively 
monitoring contractor performance.” 
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The Finance personnel scored statement 25 comparable to the Acquisitions’ 
assessment of statement 25 with a highly favorable mean score of 3.86 but also gave 3.86 
to statement 29.  It reads, “My organization uses agency personnel or external parties 
with appropriate knowledge, skills, and responsibilities to monitor internal control over 
the acquisition process on a continuous basis.”  For their least favorable, finance 
personnel gave statement 31a a mean score of 2.14 and statement 32b received a mean 
score of 2.00.  The Finance personnel agreed with the Contracting assessment of 
statement 26 and gave it a mean score of 3.00 but also gave 3.00 to statement 30.  It 
reads, “My organization effectively uses and requires its contractors to use earned value 
management as an investment planning and control tool.” 
The “Other” functional discipline this time agreed with the Contracting personnel 
in their assessment of statement 24.  They gave it a mean score of 4.20 but also gave 4.20 
to statements 27 and 30.  Statement 27 reads, “My organization clearly defines the roles 
and responsibilities for those who perform contract management and oversight.”  The 
favorable score to statement 30 is the first time discussed so far where one group, this 
time Other, has an opposite assessment as another group, in this case Finance.  For 
Other’s least favorable, statements 32a and 32b received a mean score of 2.60.  The next 
lowest mean score is 3.20 for both statements thirty-two c and thirty-two d.  They read, 
“A significant percentage of contracts fail to meet performance.” and “A significant 
percentage of contracts fail to meet quality requirements” respectfully. 
Figure 22 is a snapshot of how the acquisition community individually ranked the 
12 statements in this category.  Table 4 and Figure 22 below gives a breakout of the mean 
score for each question by individual functional disciplines along with the overall mean 
average for each question. 
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Scale of Mean Score 0 - 5
(5 being highest positive)  




Table 4.   CSF 3 Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes 
 
4. Enabling Financial Accountability 
For this final critical success factor of Enabling Financial Accountability, the 
statement with highest overall positive agreement was statement 37 with a mean score of 
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4.08.  Statement 37 reads, “Financial data resulting from new contracts, task orders and 
contract modifications is clear and recorded properly.”  Following in second was a tie 
with both statement 34 and 36 having a overall mean score of 4.04.  Statement 34 reads, 
“Our acquisition force has access to and uses timely contractual financial information to 
monitor and oversee individual acquisitions.”  Statement 36 reads, “Our financial 
management system reports frequently enough to provide reasonable assurance of 
accountability in acquisitions.”  The statement with the lowest agreement was statements 
39 with a mean score of 3.08.  Statement 39 reads, “My organization has a risk 
assessment process in place to address improper payments.”  Although statement 34 
scored well one of the personnel feedback showed some cynicism: “Not clear to me that 
actual use of data is pervasive and skillful in all projects/programs.” 
The Acquisitions functional discipline rated their second highest score for the 
entire questionnaire to statements 34 and 37.  These statements received a mean score of 
4.22 and state, ”Our acquisition force has access to and uses timely contractual financial 
information to monitor and oversee individual acquisitions.” and “Financial data resulting 
from new contracts, task orders and contract modifications is clear and recorded 
properly” respectfully.  The lowest rating by the Acquisitions personnel for this critical 
success factor is a mean score of 3.44 to statement 39 that reads, “My organization has a 
risk assessment process in place to address improper payments.” 
The Contracting personnel are consistent with the Acquisitions personnel about 
statement 37 and give it a mean score of 4.25.  Their lowest agreement though is with 
statements 35 and 38 both with a mean score of 2.25.  Statement 35 reads, “My 
organization’s financial management system integrates with the contract management 
system.”  Statement 38 reads, “My organization measures how often erroneous or 
improper payments are made.” 
The Finance personnel are consistent with the Acquisitions personnel scoring 
their second highest score for the entire questionnaire to statements 34 and 37.  However, 
Finance personnel add statement 36 and give all of them a mean score of 4.14.  Statement 
36 reads, “Our financial management system reports frequently enough to provide 
reasonable assurance of accountability in acquisitions.”  They also agree with the 
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Acquisitions functional discipline in their least favorable rating of statement 39, 
mentioned previously with a mean score of 3.00. 
The “Other” personnel gave statement 34, 35, and 36 their highest mean score for 
this critical success factor with a score of 4.25.  Statement 34 was also rated high by 
Acquisitions, where as, statement 36 was also rated high by Finance.  In contrast, 
statement 35 was rated as a least favorable by Contracting.  This is the second direct 
contrast in the questionnaire results.  The Other job group agree with Acquisitions and 
Finance in placing statement 39 as their least favorable with a mean score of 3.00. 
Figure 23 is a snapshot of how the acquisition community individually ranked the 
12 statements in this category.  Table 5 and Figure 23 below gives a breakout of the mean 
score for each question by individual functional disciplines along with the overall mean 
average for each question. 



































Scale of Mean Score 0 - 5
(5 being highest positive)
 




Table 5.   CSF 4 Enabling Financial Accountability 
 
5. Cumulative Observations 
Seen as a whole, there are some observations that can glean a little more insight to 
SMC’s ability to effectively manage the acquisitions policies and processes.  
Questionnaire statements 2 and 37 are the two highest rated statements.  The respondents 
are confident in their use of cross-functional teams and their clarity and proper recording 
of new financial data.  Questionnaire statements 19, 32a and 32b are the three lowest 
rated statements as shown in the spreadsheet in appendix 3 “All Statements in Survey.”  
The respondents agree there is little training on how to manage supplier relationships and 
they understand the reality of their contracts failing to meet cost and schedule. 
When comparing the mean of the means for the four critical success factors, 
Empowering Cross-Functional Teams is the highest with a score of 3.74.  This probably 
reflects the culture that Cross-Functional Teams have been used extensively in SMC.  
The same analysis shows that Managing and Engaging Suppliers was ranked the lowest 
factor with a score of 3.32.  Perhaps this area can use more emphasis.  An analysis 
throughout job groups shows that the Acquisitions respondents are the most positive with 
a mean of means score of 3.62 and Contracting respondents are the most negative with a 
mean of means score of 3.22.  Although this observation can be interpreted in many 
different ways, it at least shows the different perspectives that are brought about by the 
different functional disciplines with in SMC’s acquisition community. 
Overall, the respondents to this questionnaire were positive about the ability of 
their organizations to manage effectively and efficiently USAF space acquisitions 
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process.  93.18 percent of the statements were given a favorable mean score (above 3.00).  
This leaves less than 7 percent of statements with an overall unfavorable mean score 
(below 3.00).  Although the recommendations that follow will focus on the statements 
rated unfavorably, there is also room to improve on many statements rated at least 
somewhat favorably. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Very often recommendations focus on the negative findings during a study.  To 
avoid a purely negative section we will commence with the particular actions that 
respondents highlighted as strengths in the questionnaire.  The following items received a 
cumulative mean score of over 4.0, with the highest mean score allowable being 5.0.   
Statement 2 and 4 are a big key to effective acquisitions.  The respondents 
strongly agree that their organizations use cross-functional teams and that they feel 
empowered to make decisions that affect the projects outcome.  The initial 
recommendation is to continue to focus on these cross-functional teams.  Use them 
efficiently and effectively by bringing the correct mix of stakeholders to SMC who will 
provide pertinent knowledge and program status, and continue to give the team leaders 
the proper authority to make the decisions required to move the program in the right 
direction.  The GAO assessment framework sees this combination of virtues as keys for 
project implementation. 
Statement 34, 36, and 37 are all part of the Enabling Financial Accountability 
Critical Success Factor.  By scoring these three statements high, the respondents give us 
great insight to the importance they place on financial information.  The second 
recommendation is to continue to use and perfect timely and accurate contractual 
financial information.  The GAO assessment framework states that concentrating on this 
information is indicative for good acquisitions outcomes. 
The recommendations for improvement stem from some of the lowest cumulative 




3.30.  Although statements with a score over 3.0 show a degree of positive agreement, 
they are still included here since they were comparatively low and therefore have been 
noted for improvement. 
The most important recommendation in this research paper is to provide more 
and/or better training on how to manage supplier relationships throughout the 
acquisitions workforce.  The lowest scoring statement fell into for the Managing and 
Engaging Suppliers current success factor section; therefore, this area is identified as an 
area as needing attention.  The GAO assessment framework sites concern with an 
acquisitions workforce that lacks the skills, knowledge, and expertise to manage supplier 
relationships effectively.  This report does not infer that the workforce indeed lacks skills, 
knowledge, and expertise, but the recommendation is in place to ensure that the 
workforce receives training that enhances their current abilities. 
Statement 10 was the lowest scoring of the Empowering Cross-Functional Teams 
section.  This statement shows there may not be enough of an incentive structure in place 
to encourage meeting project goals.  One of the cautions that the GAO assessment 
framework indicates may hinder good acquisition outcomes states: “Teams fail to use key 
elements of good project management techniques, including monitoring project 
performance and establishing controls and incentives to meet project goals.”  A key part 
of this caution is establishing incentives.  Project goals may be met in the short term by 
simply monitoring and controlling, but it is our recommendation that for the long term, 
creative incentives should be part of the organizations project management strategy.  
Statement 26 from Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes section shows a similar problem to the above recommendation.  In this case, 
instead of incentives, the questionnaire is talking about setting up rewards.  Respondents 
were not sure about rewards to the workforce for effectively monitoring contractor 
performance.  The recommendation in this case is to set up creative rewards to better 
incentivize the workforce in this vital aspect of acquisitions management. 
The lowest mean score for the critical success factor, Enabling Financial 
Accountability, was   the lowest scoring statement was number 35.  The respondents are 
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least favorable about their organization having a risk management process in place to 
address improper payments.  A caution by the GAO assessment framework states that 
inadequate transaction processing, particularly improper payment, occurring frequently 
hinder good acquisition outcomes.  Therefore, our final recommendation is that more 
emphasis be place on a risk assessment process for financial data, especially in the areas 
of identification and mitigation of improper payments. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the findings from the questionnaire given to SMC 
personnel.  By analyzing the questionnaire results using the four current success factors 
under the “Effectively managing the acquisition process” element of the GAO assessment 
framework.  We have highlighted strengths and weaknesses in SMC’s ability to 
effectively and efficiently manage the acquisitions policies and processes within the 
USAF space acquisition community.  This chapter then took this information and 
compared it to the “look for” and “cautions” of the GAO assessment framework to 
indicate practices and activities that either facilitate or hinder good acquisitions 
outcomes.  The recommendations suggested are a direct reflection of these practices and 
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this report was to analyze the current structure of USAF space 
acquisitions.  More specifically this research looked at AFSPC’s current polices and 
processes, based on the FY02 acquisition realignment, of SMC from AFMC to AFSPC to 
determine if they are operating efficiently and effectively.  This report provides analysis 
based on literary review and questionnaires gathered from personnel in the USAF space 
acquisition community.  This research concentrated on the efficient and effective policies 
and procedures of space acquisitions in relation to the functional disciplines of 
acquisition, contracting and program control (budget). 
To analyze Space Acquisitions, GAO’s “Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies” was utilized.  The GAO assessment 
framework provides four cornerstones to analyze acquisition communities.  However, 
due to limitations this report was narrowed down to an analysis of A.F. Space 
Acquisitions using the cornerstone of “Policies and Practices.”  It was then further 
tapered down in order to concentrate on the element “Effectively Managing the 
Acquisition Process.”   
From the element, “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process” the GAO 
assessment framework provided four critical success factors; (1) Empowering Cross 
Function Teams, (2) Managing and Engaging Suppliers, (3) Monitoring and Providing 
Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes and (4) Enabling Financial Accountability.  
These critical success factors were used to construct a survey for SMC personnel.  The 
surveys provided management and leadership insight from personnel with hands-on 
knowledge of space acquisitions.   
As a recap, questionnaire statements 2 and 37 are the two highest rated 
statements.  The respondents are confident in their use of cross-functional teams and their 
clarity and proper recording of new financial data.  Questionnaire statements 19, 32a and 
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32b are the three lowest rated statements.  The respondents agree there is little training on 
how to manage supplier relationships and they understand the reality of their contracts 
failing to meet cost and schedule. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Distributing the questionnaire generated in this research paper to AFMC 
acquisition personnel would provide them with an assessment tool to analyze how 
effective and efficient their current acquisition polices and procedures are.  It can provide 
management and command leadership with insight into what levels their acquisition 
community is operating, in reference to maintaining efficient and effective policies and 
procedures in place in relations to their acquisition missions.  Furthermore, the survey 
could be utilized in other USAF commands or bases that have acquisition communities. 
AFSPC should share with other commands best practices noted in this report.  
Furthermore, they can retrieve information from AFMC on areas that need attention.  
This information can help AFSPC correct areas of weakness or determine if it is an 
USAF wide deficiency.  If it is determined to be an USAF wide deficiency then a cross-
command tiger team can be implemented for corrective actions. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS 
Valuable insight came from this project and yet, as mentioned earlier, it was 
limited in scope.  Research based off the other two elements under the GAO assessment 
framework cornerstone “Policies and Procedures” would give AFSPC a stronger analysis 
of their space acquisition policies and procedures.  Also, research based off the other 
three GAO assessment framework cornerstones would provide AFSPC with a more in-
depth analysis of their space acquisition functions.  In addition, DoD could gain further 
insight into its acquisition communities by utilizing this same GAO assessment 
framework to analyze other organizations like AFMC, NAVAIR, NAVSEA, etc.  Figure 
24 provides all of the cornerstones, elements and critical success factors provided by the 





Figure 24. Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function (From: Government 
Accountability Office. “Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal 





























Greetings from the Naval Postgraduate School.  This questionnaire should take 
approximately 10 minutes.  It has 37 questions and 4 blocks for comments.  For a thesis 
project, please help us better analyze the current structure of the acquisitions arm of Air 
Force Space Command.  This questionnaire is for SMC acquisitions, contracting and 
finance personnel.  The questionnaire is anonymous and follows the regulations set by the 
Naval Postgraduate School's Human Subjects Committee.   
 
Click "Next" to start the survey.  If you need to leave the survey at any time, just click 
"Exit this survey".  Your answers will be saved. 
 
1. Is your job at SMC more closely associated with:   
   Acquisitions  
   Contracting  
   Finance  
   Other (please specify) 
 
2. EMPOWERING CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS: 
 
Note: All these questions are based on what you have seen within your organization since 
the SMC realignment into AFSPC. 
 
At the end of every section there is a comments block where you can provide extra 





2: Disagree 3: Neither agree 
nor disagree 




2. Our organization uses cross-functional teams in performing acquisitions activities.   
3. We involve staff from field offices in acquisitions decisions.   
4. I feel empowered to make decisions that affect the projects outcome.   
5. I use a project plan to manage and control implementation of projects.   
6. My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for schedule and cost.   
7. My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for major milestones and 
target dates.   
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8. My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for risk associated with the 
project.   
9. I involve individuals outside the project team to regularly review the status of cost, 
schedule or performance goals.   
10. There are incentives in place to encourage my team to meet project goals.   
11. Our teams are held accountable for meeting cost, schedule and performance goals.   
  
12. There is open, honest and clear communication among all stakeholders (team 
members, program officials, contractors)   
13. Please provide extra feedback here for any of the questions from this section. State 
the question number and provide any explanation or clarification.   
  
3. MANAGING AND ENGAGING SUPPLIERS 
 
14. My organization has a process to identify key suppliers.   
a. My organization shares key supplier knowledge across the organization.                  
15. My organization uses a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong supplier 
base.   
16. My organization uses strategic purchasing managers for key goods and services.   
17. The strategic purchasing managers in our organization are actively involved in:   
a. Defining requirements with internal clients                  
b. Negotiating with potential providers of goods and services                  
c. Assisting and resolving performance or other issues after the contract is 
awarded                  
18. As a core business strategy, my organization embraces effective supplier 
relationships.   
19. My organization provides training to its acquisition workforce on how to manage 
supplier relationships.   
20. My organization has established an effective communication and feedback system 
with its suppliers to continually assess and improve its own and its supplier’s 
performance.   
21. My organization fosters an environment in which its suppliers invest their intellectual 
capital – their ideas – into the venture.   
22. Please provide extra feedback here for any of the questions from this section. State 
the question number and provide any explanation or clarification.   
  
4. MONITORING AND PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OT ACHIEVE 
DESIRED OUTCOMES 
 
23. My organization tracks the types of acquisition methods used for acquiring goods and 
services to assess workload and training requirements.   
24. My organization has processes and controls in place to ensure effective oversight of 
contractor performance.   
25. My organization has processes and controls in place to ensure effective oversight of 
employees making purchases.   
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26. My organization rewards our workforce for effectively monitoring contractor 
performance.   
27. My organization clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for those who perform 
contract management and oversight.   
28. My organization has taken required actions to ensure that it has adequate staff with 
the right skills, knowledge, and training to implement policies and processes and to 
oversee contractors.   
29. My organization uses agency personnel or external parties with appropriate 
knowledge, skills, and responsibilities to monitor internal control over the acquisition 
process on a continuous basis.   
30. My organization effectively uses and requires its contractors to use earned value 
management as an investment planning and control tool.   
31. My organization monitors effectiveness of policies and processes:   
a. My organization completes a cost benefit analysis when considering alternative 
policies and processes                  
b. My organization follows its own findings identified in the monitoring efforts                  
32. A significant percentage of contracts fail to meet:   
a. Cost                  
b. Schedule                  
c. Performance                  
d. Quality requirements                  
33. Please provide extra feedback here for any of the questions from this section. State 
the question number and provide any explanation or clarification.   
  
5. ENABLING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
34. Our acquisition force has access to and uses timely contractual financial information 
to monitor and oversee individual acquisitions.   
35. My organization’s financial management system integrates with the contract 
management system.   
36. Our financial management system reports frequently enough to provide reasonable 
assurance of accountability in acquisitions.   
37. Financial data resulting from new contracts, task orders and contract modifications is 
clear and recorded properly.   
38. My organization measures how often erroneous or improper payments are made.   
39. My organization has a risk assessment process in place to address improper 
payments.   
40. My organization takes appropriate corrective action when the contractor is not 
meeting expectations for cost, schedule or performance.   
41. Please provide extra feedback here for any of the questions from this section. State 
the question number and provide any explanation or clarification  
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B. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
 
Empowering Cross-Functional Teams
Question Number: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Mean
Acquisitions 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 3.64
4 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 4.18
4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.64
5 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3.82
4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3.64
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3.64
4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 3.64
5 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 3.91
4 3 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 3 2.91
4 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3.91
5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4.00
4 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3.45
5 5 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 4.09
4 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4.45
Mean 4.36 3.86 4.00 3.86 3.57 3.64 3.57 3.71 3.36 3.93 3.71 3.78
Mean
Contracting 5 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3.64
5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 2 4.00
4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 1 4 4 3.27
4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 4 3.55
Mean 4.50 3.50 4.25 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.25 2.50 3.50 3.50 3.61
Mean
Finance 4 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.73
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 3.82
5 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 4 5 5 4.36
4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 5 4.00
4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.18
5 5 4 4 3 4 3 5 4 5 4 4.18
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4.09
Mean 4.29 4.00 3.71 4.00 3.14 3.43 3.14 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.86 3.62
Other: Mean
Systems Eng 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 3.45
Engineering 5 5 5 4 1 5 5 2 4 4 4 4.00
Sustainment 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 3.64
Cost Analysis 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.45
Administrative 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
Mean 4.40 4.00 4.40 4.00 3.40 4.40 4.20 3.20 3.60 3.60 3.80 3.91
Cumulative Mean 4.37 3.87 4.03 3.87 3.47 3.73 3.60 3.50 3.30 3.70 3.73 3.74
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Managing and Engaging Suppliers
Question Number: 14 14a 15 16 17a 17b 17c 18 19 20 21
Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Mean
Acquisitions 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 4 2 2.91
4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3.55
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
4 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 4 3.45
2 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3.00
4 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3.55
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3.82
4 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 3.00
4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.55
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00
2 2 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.18
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
Mean 3.58 3.50 3.42 3.08 3.25 3.33 3.17 3.83 3.17 3.75 3.50 3.42
Mean
Contracting 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 2.18
5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 1 4 1 4.00
3 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 3.09
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3.27
Mean 3.50 3.00 3.75 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.00 3.50 2.75 3.14
Mean
Finance 4 4 4 1 3 3 3 2 1 1 4 2.73
4 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 2 4 2 3.18
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00
4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 5 3.55
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00
3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 3 3.82
4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 3.45
Mean 3.57 3.29 3.71 3.00 3.14 3.14 3.29 3.29 2.43 3.43 3.43 3.25
Other: Mean
Systems Eng 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3.73
Engineering 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.73
Sustainment 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3.09
Cost Analysis 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3.18
Administrative 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
Mean 3.40 3.60 3.40 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.80 3.40 3.20 3.20 3.35




Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes
* * * *
Question Number: 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 31a 31b 32a 32b 32c 32d
Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Mean
Acquisitions 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2.73
2 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4.33
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 4 4 4.33
4 2 5 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3.60
4 3 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 4 3.27
3 4 4 3 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3.47
3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.80
4 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 2.67
4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.73
3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3.07
Mean 3.50 3.90 4.20 3.40 3.90 3.60 3.50 3.60 3.20 3.60 3.50 2.90 2.80 3.40 3.50 3.50
Mean
Contracting 1 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2.53
5 5 2 1 5 1 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 2.73
2 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 2 3 3 1 2 4 4 3.20
5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3.87
Mean 3.25 4.50 3.75 2.25 3.75 2.50 3.25 4.00 2.25 2.75 2.75 1.50 1.75 4.00 4.00 3.08
Mean
Finance 2 1 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1.87
4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3.33
5 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 3.87
3 3 5 4 5 3 4 2 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 3.00
3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.07
4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.07
5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 1 1 3 3 3.53
Mean 3.71 3.43 3.86 3.00 3.71 3.00 3.86 3.00 3.71 3.29 3.71 2.14 2.00 3.14 3.14 3.25
Other: Mean
Systems Eng 4 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3.47
Engineering 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3.87
Sustainment 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.73
Cost Analysis 3 5 3 4 5 2 3 5 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 3.47
Administrative 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3.47
Mean 3.60 4.20 3.80 3.60 4.20 3.60 3.80 4.20 3.80 3.80 3.80 2.60 2.60 3.20 3.20 3.60
Cumulative Mean: 3.54 3.92 3.96 3.15 3.88 3.27 3.62 3.62 3.31 3.42 3.50 2.42 2.38 3.38 3.42 3.39
 





Question Number: 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Cumulative
Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Answer: Mean Mean Count Mean x Count
Acquisitions 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3.71 3.16 44.00 139
5 5 4 4 5 3 5 4.43 4.11 44.00 181
3.64 11.00 40
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 4.07 44.00 179
4 3 4 4 2 2 4 3.29 3.52 44.00 155
3.30 37.00 122
4 4 3 4 3 3 4 3.57 3.55 44.00 156
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00 4.02 44.00 177
2.91 11.00 32
4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.57 3.20 44.00 141
4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4.57 3.89 44.00 171
4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3.43 3.20 44.00 141
3.64 22.00 80
4.23 22.00 93
Mean 4.22 3.78 4.11 4.22 3.89 3.44 4.00 3.95 3.6212 499.00 1807.00
Mean Mean Count
Contracting 2 2 2 4 1 2 4 2.43 2.70 44.00 119
4 4 5 5 2 2 2 3.43 3.48 44.00 153
3 1 3 4 3 3 2 2.71 3.11 44.00 137
4 2 4 4 3 3 4 3.43 3.57 44.00 157
Mean 3.25 2.25 3.50 4.25 2.25 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.22 176.00 566.00
Mean Mean Count
Finance 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4.43 2.45 44.00
4 3 4 5 4 2 4 3.71 3.48 44.00
5 3 5 4 4 2 3 3.71 3.75 44.00
3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2.43 3.30 44.00
3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3.29 3.11 44.00
5 4 4 4 3 3 5 4.00 4.02 44.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.14 3.75 44.00
Mean 4.14 3.43 4.14 4.14 3.57 3.00 3.29 3.67 3.41 308.00
Other: Mean Mean Count
Systems Eng 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 3.00 3.45 44.00 152
Engineering 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3.71 3.59 44.00 158
Sustainment 3.51 37.00 130
Cost Analysis 5 5 5 4 3 3 5 4.29 3.77 44.00 166
Administrative 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 3.82 44.00 168
Mean 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.50 3.75 3.63 213.00 774.00








C. ALL STATEMENTS IN SURVEY 
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All Statements in Survey  
(highest to lowest mean scores) 
Statement Acquisitions Statement Contracting Statement Finance Statement Other Statement Overall 
2 436 2 450 2 450 2 440 2 437 
34 422 24 450 4 425 4 440 32a 408 
37 422 4 425 31 414 7 440 31 404 
25 420 32a 425 31b 414 31 425 31b 404 
36 411 30 400 32a 414 31a 425 4 403 
4 400 32c 400 25 386 31b 425 25 396 
40 400 32d 400 29 386 8 420 24 392 
11 393 6 375 6 375 24 420 27 388 
24 390 7 375 7 375 27 420 3 387 
27 390 8 375 8 375 30 420 5 387 
38 389 15 375 15 371 3 400 7 373 
3 386 25 375 23 371 5 400 12 373 
5 386 27 375 27 371 12 380 11 370 
18 383 3 350 31 371 18 380 29 362 
35 378 5 350 31b 371 25 380 30 362 
20 375 11 350 14 357 29 380 18 361 
9 371 12 350 32b 357 31 380 8 360 
12 371 14 350 3 350 31a 380 14 354 
7 364 20 350 5 350 31b 380 20 354 
28 360 31b 350 11 350 10 360 23 354 
30 360 9 325 12 350 11 360 32d 354 
31a 360 17a 325 20 343 14a 360 9 350 
14 358 17b 325 21 343 23 360 31b 350 
6 357 17c 325 24 343 26 360 31a 350 
8 357 18 325 31a 343 28 360 6 347 
14a 350 23 325 14a 329 32a 350 32b 346 
21 350 29 325 17c 329 32b 350 31a 342 
23 350 31 325 18 329 32d 350 32d 342 
29 350 14a 300 31a 329 6 340 14a 339 
31b 350 16 300 32d 329 14 340 32c 338 
32d 350 32d 300 9 325 15 340 21 332 
39 344 21 275 17a 314 19 340 31 331 
15 342 31a 275 17b 314 9 320 10 330 
26 340 31b 275 32c 314 16 320 28 327 
32c 340 10 250 32d 314 17a 320 17b 325 
10 336 28 250 16 300 17b 320 17a 321 
17b 333 32c 250 26 300 17c 320 17c 321 
17a 325 26 225 28 300 20 320 15 320 
31 320 31 225 30 300 21 320 26 315 
17c 317 31a 225 32c 300 32c 320 32c 308 
19 317 32b 225 10 250 32d 320 16 307 
16 308 19 200 19 243 32c 300 19 286 
32a 290 32b 175 32a 214 32a 260 32a 242 
32b 280 32a 150 32b 200 32b 260 32b 238 
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D. GAO ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK INDICATORS FOR 
"EFFECTIVELY MANAGING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS" 
 
Element – “Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process” 
 
I. Critical Success Factor – “Empowering Cross-Functional Teams” 
 
 KEY QUESTIONS 
• To what extent does the agency use cross-functional teams in performing 
acquisition activities? Are staff from field offices involved at any level? How? 
• Do team members feel empowered to make decisions and are they invested in 
the project’s outcome? 
• Do the teams use a project plan to manage and control project implementation? 
• Does the project plan include performance measurement baselines for schedule 
and cost, major milestones, and target dates and risks associated with the project? 
• Do individuals outside the project team regularly review the status of cost, 
schedule, and performance goals? 
• Are incentives in place to encourage teams to meet project goals? 
• How are teams held accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance 
goals? 
• Is there good communication among all stakeholders? 
 
LOOK FOR 
• The agency uses cross-functional teams to plan for and manage projects. These 
teams develop a project plan to implement projects effectively. 
• The agency systematically monitors project performance and establishes controls 
and incentives for accountability. 
• Open, honest, and clear communication is encouraged among all parties, 
including team members, program officials, and contractors. 
 
CAUTIONS 
• The agency makes limited use of cross-functional teams. 
• Project team members do not feel empowered to make decisions or invested in 
the project outcome. 
• Teams fail to use key elements of good project management techniques, including 
monitoring project performance and establishing controls and incentives to meet 
project goals. 
 
II. Critical Success Factor – “Managing and Engaging Suppliers” 
 
 KEY QUESTIONS 
• Does the agency have a process to identify key suppliers? 
• Does the agency use a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong 
supplier base? 
• Has the agency established commodity managers for key goods and services? 
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• What is the role of the commodity manager? 
• Has the agency embraced effective supplier relationships as a core business 
strategy? 
• Does the agency train its acquisition workforce on how to manage supplier 
relationships? 
• Has the agency established an effective communication and feedback system 
with its suppliers to continually assess and improve its own and its suppliers’ 
performance? 
• Does the agency foster an environment in which suppliers invest their intellectual 
capital—their ideas—into the venture? 
 
LOOK FOR 
• The agency uses stringent supplier selection criteria while maintaining an 
appropriate level of competition among suppliers. 
• The agency has established commodity managers for key goods and services. 
• Commodity managers are actively involved in defining requirements with 
internal clients, negotiating with potential providers of goods and services, and 
assisting in resolving performance or other issues after the contract is awarded. 
• The agency has established an effective communication and feedback system 
with its suppliers, such as designating an authoritative person as a single interface 
with key suppliers; using integrated teams to facilitate sharing of information; 
establishing an objective basis for providing feedback by setting performance 
measures and expectations in terms of quality, responsiveness, timeliness, and cost; 
providing periodic “report cards” and meeting formally with key suppliers to 
discuss issues; and using surveys, supplier meetings, and formal agency-supplier 
councils or supplier advisory councils to assess existing customer-supplier working 
arrangements, identify problem areas, and report back to suppliers. 
 
CAUTIONS 
• Knowledge of its key suppliers is not shared across the agency. 
• The agency does not take full advantage of the suppliers’ intellectual capital, 
such as design or product ideas. 
• The agency makes limited or no use of commodity managers to manage the 
acquisition of key goods and services. 
• Commodity managers lack expertise, knowledge, or adequate training in the 
goods and services being procured. 
• The agency is dependent on one or two suppliers for key goods or services. 
• The agency continues to select the same suppliers without periodically 
assessing whether the goods and services offered are competitive in terms of 
price, quality, and performance. 
• The acquisition workforce lacks the skills, knowledge, and expertise to manage 








• Does the agency track the types of acquisition methods used for acquiring 
goods and services to assess workload and training requirements? 
• What tools, processes, and controls does the agency use to ensure effective 
oversight of contractor performance? 
• What tools, processes, and controls does the agency use to ensure effective 
oversight of employees making purchases? 
• What incentives does the acquisition workforce have to effectively monitor 
contractor performance? 
• Does the agency clearly define the roles and responsibilities for those who 
perform contract management and oversight? 
• What actions has the agency taken to ensure that it has adequate staff with the 
right skills, knowledge, and training to implement policies and processes and to 
oversee contractors? 
• Do agency personnel or external parties with appropriate knowledge, skills, 
and responsibilities monitor internal control over the acquisition process on a 
continuous basis? 
• Does the agency effectively use and require its contractors to use earned value 
management as an investment planning and control tool? 
 
LOOK FOR 
• The agency has undertaken a workforce-planning effort to ensure that 
individuals who award, manage, and monitor contracts have clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities and have the appropriate workload, skills, and 
training to perform their jobs effectively. 
• The agency employs contract monitoring plans or risk-based strategies, and 
tracks contractor performance. 
• The agency regularly reviews contract oversight processes, identifies areas 
needing improvement, and establishes and implements corrective action plans. 
• The agency monitors the effectiveness of policies and processes, completes a 
cost benefit analysis when considering alternative policies and processes, and 
follows up on findings identified in monitoring efforts. 
• The agency’s suppliers have established earned value management systems, and 
the agency verifies that it and its suppliers effectively implement earned value 
management processes and procedures on all applicable programs. 
 
CAUTIONS 
• Personnel responsible for contract management have skills and knowledge 
gaps that inhibit their ability to properly oversee the types of contracts used by 
the agency. 
• The agency does not monitor whether its contracts meet cost, schedule, 
performance, and quality requirements. 
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• A significant percentage of contracts fail to meet cost, schedule, performance, 
and quality requirements. 
• The agency does not assign clear roles and responsibilities for overseeing 
contracts. 
• There are material weaknesses and/or reportable conditions related to 
acquisitions in the agency’s performance and accountability report. 
• Earned value data are unavailable or unreliable, and earned value management 
principles are not properly implemented. 
 
IV. Critical Success Factor – “Enabling Financial Accountability” 
 
KEY QUESTIONS 
• Does the acquisition workforce have access to and use timely contractual 
financial information to monitor and oversee individual acquisitions? 
• Is the agency’s financial management system integrated with its contract 
management system? 
• Does the financial management system report frequently enough to provide 
reasonable assurance of accountability in acquisitions? 
• Are financial data resulting from new contracts, task orders, and contract 
modifications clear and recorded properly? 
• Does the agency measure how often erroneous or improper payments are 
made? Is a risk assessment process in place to address improper payments? 
 
LOOK FOR 
• The acquisition workforce has ready access to information on obligated and 
expended funds, with sufficient information to assure proper oversight and 
accounting at the contract level. 
• Entries are made to the financial management system that update the contract 
management and property accountability systems. 
• The agency reports frequently enough—monthly or quarterly—to ensure 
accountability in the acquisition function. 
• Adjustments to contract accounting records are clearly reported and accurate; 
such adjustments represent a low percentage of financial transactions. 
• Erroneous and improper payments and cost overruns are tracked and are not a 
significant problem. 
• The agency takes appropriate corrective action when the contractor is not 
meeting expectations for cost, schedule, or performance. 
 
CAUTIONS 
• Acquisition and financial management staff lacks access to critical information, 
including fiscal year; appropriation/Treasury fund symbol; organization code; 
cost center; object classification; estimated amount; project code; program 
code; transaction date; action code; subject-to-funds-availability indicator; asset 
identifier code; contractor code/name; trading partner; trading partner code; 
award date; and amounts increased and/or decreased. 
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• Acquisition and financial management staff independently update the same 
types of data into independent financial and contract management systems. 
• Financial management systems fail to provide transaction details to support 
account balances or identify the method of acquisition, lack evidence that the 
contractor’s final invoice has been submitted and paid, or fail to perform other 
transaction processing and routine accounting activities adequately. 
• Inadequate transaction processing, particularly improper payments, occur 
frequently. 
• Financial management systems fail to include the taxpayer identification 
number for contractor identification and income reporting and debt collection 
purposes. 
The agency receives a qualified, disclaimed, or adverse audit opinion, which 
may indicate poor accountability. 
• Auditors note weaknesses in the agency’s acquisition or financial management 
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